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ARTICLES
A  FRAMEWORK  FOR  BAILOUT  REGULATION
Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner*
During the height of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, the government bailed out numerous
corporations, including banks, investment banks, and automobile manufacturers.  While the
bailouts helped end the financial crisis, they were intensely controversial at the time, and were
marred by the ad hoc, politicized quality of the government intervention.  We examine the
bailouts from the financial crisis as well as earlier bailouts to determine what policy considera-
tions best justify them, and how they are best designed.  The major considerations in bailing out
and structuring the bailout of a firm are the macroeconomic impact of failure; the moral hazard
effect of the bailout; the discriminatory effect of the bailout; and procedural fairness.  Future
bailouts should be guided by principles that ensure that the decisionmaker properly takes into
account these factors.
INTRODUCTION
Since the financial crisis of 2008, the word “bailout” has become a term
of abuse in our political lexicon.  The bailouts of numerous financial institu-
tions and two automobile manufacturers were extremely controversial.1  Con-
gress sought in the Dodd-Frank Act to ensure that bailouts would never take
place again, going so far as to write into the preamble that one purpose of
© 2016 Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* University of Chicago Law School.  We thank Stephen Choi, Kate Judge, William
Hubbard, Richard McAdams, Eric Rasmusen, Michael Simkovic, David Yermack, and
participants in workshops at NYU Stern School of Business and the University of Chicago
Law School and at the Canadian Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting for
comments, and Paul Rogerson and Paulina Wu for research assistance.  The Weil Faculty
Research Fund provided generous support.  Although we do not take a position on AIG’s
claims in its bailout-related litigation, we should disclose that one of us (Posner) has done
work in that litigation for the plaintiff.  He is grateful to the late Robert Silver for
illuminating discussions about bailout law and policy in the context of that litigation.
1 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Constituents Make Their Bailout Views Known, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
24, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/business/25voices.html?_r=0 (“Senator
Barbara Boxer, Democrat of California, has received nearly 17,000 e-mail messages, nearly
all opposed to the bailout, her office said.”).
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the Act was “to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts.”2  Presi-
dent Barack Obama agreed that “because of this law, the American people
will never again be asked to foot the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes.”3  But
after his former Treasury Secretary admitted that Dodd-Frank would not end
bailouts, Republicans in the House of Representatives issued a scathing
report entitled Failing to End “Too Big to Fail”: An Assessment of the Dodd-Frank
Act Four Years Later.4  The political unpopularity of bailouts is matched in the
academic literature, where the traditional view is that bailouts are almost
always unwise, and usually result from political failure.5
But the word “bailout” is used in different ways, and it is sometimes hard
to understand what people are complaining about.  A bailout is, essentially, a
transfer of money or other resources from the government to a private agent
(or sometimes to another government).  Such transfers occur every day and
hardly ever cause anyone to lift an eyebrow.  The government transfers
money or other valuable consideration to solar panel manufacturers, dairy
farmers, poor people, and research universities.  While many people disagree
about the wisdom of these transfers, they do not regard them as illegitimate
in the same way that they often regard bailouts.
We can make some progress by observing that in common parlance the
word bailout refers to a subset of transfers where the transfer is intended to
rescue an agent who cannot meet its financial obligations.  Even here, how-
ever, the source of complaint is obscure.  If the government is willing to sub-
sidize a manufacturer of solar power panels by giving it money, making loans
to it, or guaranteeing its debt (as it often is), then what’s wrong with a policy
of paying off an unpaid debt if otherwise it would default?  The effect of all
these policies is the same: to lower the cost of capital for the beneficiary.  The
policy justification is also the same: to encourage people to invest in solar
power.
Indeed, the government routinely helps agents who are about to default
on debts.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), for example,
insures people against loss of their deposits up to $250,000.6  If a bank fails,
the FDIC transfers money to depositors, in this way paying the bank’s debts
(or some of them) for it.  Similarly, if a natural disaster strikes, the govern-
ment frequently assists victims by supplying them with loan guarantees and
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641).
3 Remarks on Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1087, 1089 (July 21, 2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2010-
book2/pdf/PPP-2010-book2.pdf.
4 REPUBLICAN STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON FINANCIAL SERVS., FAILING TO END “TOO BIG TO
FAIL”: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT FOUR YEARS LATER (2014), http://financial-
services.house.gov/uploadedfiles/071814_tbtf_report_final.pdf.
5 See infra Part I.
6 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (2012).
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other benefits that make it easier for them to pay off their debts while they
are rebuilding their lives.7
FDIC payments are not called “bailouts”; why not?  One reason is that
the payouts are part of a regulatory program that puts burdens on banks and
depositors.  Banks must pay for FDIC insurance, and they must submit to
regulations that are designed to prevent them from taking excessive risks.
These costs are passed on to depositors in the form of interest rates on check-
ing accounts that are lower than they would otherwise be.  Thus, the FDIC
payouts seem no more objectionable than payouts made by a private insur-
ance company.  In both cases, the insured party pays for the insurance, so
when insurance payouts are made, they do not seem undeserved.
Similarly, banks often receive cheap loans from the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem that help them through spells of illiquidity.  These discount window
loans, as they are called, do not offend public values because the banks can
receive them only if they are members of the Federal Reserve System, which
requires them to purchase capital in Federal Reserve banks and submit to
regulations.  Banks must also pay for the loans in the form of interest.
Any reasonable definition of bailouts will need to encompass “good” (or
at least uncontroversial) bailouts as well as “bad” bailouts.  We are comforta-
ble with the following definition.  A bailout occurs when the government
makes payments (including loans, loan guarantees, cash, and other types of
consideration) to a liquidity-constrained private agent in order to enable that
agent to pay its creditors and counterparties, when the agent is not entitled
to those payments under a statutory scheme.  As we will see, this definition of
bailout admits for some fuzzy cases, but it will serve.
The key feature of the bailout—and the feature that makes people so
uncomfortable—is that it is ex post.  People who operate in the private mar-
ket are expected to be responsible for their debts when they have not paid
for guarantees or insurance.  Everyone expects them to take precautions to
ensure that they can pay their debt, or not to take on the debt in the first
place.
It is for this reason that many people believe that bailouts violate the rule
of law or offend other norms of our constitutional system.8  Bailout recipi-
7 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2012) (authorizing the Small Business Administration
to offer loans and other financial assistance to businesses and private citizens after a disas-
ter).  There are many such programs. See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-195 ENR, A
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL RELIEF, INSURANCE, AND LOSS REDUCTION PROGRAMS FOR
NATURAL HAZARDS (1992); Barry J. Barnett, US Government Natural Disaster Assistance: Histori-
cal Analysis and a Proposal for the Future, 23 DISASTERS 139 (1999).
8 See, e.g., Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law:
From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
369, 392 (2009) (describing the Federal Reserve’s actions during the crisis as extreme vio-
lations of the rule of law and “flagrant” constitutional violations); Gary Lawson, Burying the
Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 58 (2010) (describing TARP as “a
constitutional monstrosity”); John B. Taylor, The Role of Policy in the Great Recession and the
Weak Recovery, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 61, 62–63 (2014) (noting that “ad hoc bailout policy”
trampled existing law); Lawrence H. White, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Central Bankers?,
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ents have no entitlement to a bailout yet they receive one anyway.  Moreover,
the prospect of a bailout may encourage firms to engage in risky behavior.
Often bailouts occur during emergencies, and it is thought that the benefici-
ary takes advantage of the press of time to push through the bailout plan.
That is why Congress sought to end bailouts once and for all in Dodd-Frank.
Yet, as we will argue, governments should not try to legislate away
bailouts.  Bailouts are socially desirable because Congress cannot anticipate
the contingencies that would make possible an ex ante insurance system that
regulates behavior and charges firms in advance for liquidity support or
other transfers.  The question then arises whether bailouts can nonetheless
be regulated in advance so that the worst types of bailouts are avoided and
only good bailouts are implemented.  In short, can we develop some rules or
principles that govern how the government uses bailouts when, by hypothe-
sis, we cannot legislate the specific conditions under which they must or must
not be used?
The answer is—yes.  Congress frequently regulates the way that the gov-
ernment (including itself, but mainly the President and regulatory agencies)
addresses some problem while nonetheless allowing it the discretion to deter-
mine whether to address the problem in the first place.  A humdrum exam-
ple comes from law enforcement.  Law enforcement officials enjoy enormous
discretion whether to respond to a call for help, investigate a crime, file
charges, and prosecute.  But they face numerous constraints on how they
pursue actions once they decide to take them.  A police officer can refrain
from helping someone pursue a bike thief, but if the officer chooses to help,
he cannot make searches without a warrant.  A prosecutor can decline to
prosecute, but if she prosecutes, she cannot do so in a way that violates the
code of ethics.
Moreover, the law already provides a basis for challenging bailouts,
albeit a weak and confusing one.  Bailouts are “givings” rather than “takings,”
and thus not directly addressed by the Takings Clause of the Constitution.9
There is no law that permits people to compel the government to bail them
out.  Yet both statutory and constitutional law provide some constraints on
bailouts.  The Fed—the major bailout agency—is governed by a statute that
limits who it can bail out, and the terms of bailouts.  The Bankruptcy Code
puts constraints on bailouts when they take place in bankruptcy.  And both
the Takings Clause and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may come
30 CATO J. 451, 451 (2010) (arguing that government officials in the crisis “consider[ed]
every possible remedy but applying the rule of law”); Todd J. Zywicki, Commentary,
Chrysler and the Rule of Law, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SB124217356836613091 (arguing that the 2009 Chrysler bailout violates the rule of law
principle).
9 Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001)
(observing that givings pose the same constitutional problems that takings do).
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into play if the government conditions a bailout on waiver of constitutional
rights.10
These bodies of law have played a role in significant litigation that has
emerged from the financial crisis.  In 2013, shareholders of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac sued the government on the ground that the federal rescue
expropriated their property by eliminating their right to the firms’ profits.
In 2011, automobile dealers brought a lawsuit against the government that
argued that during the bailout the government compelled the automakers to
terminate contracts with them.  Also in 2011, shareholders of the vast insur-
ance company AIG sued the government for diluting their equity when it
made emergency loans to AIG.  All of the lawsuits argued that the govern-
ment violated the Takings Clause, and in each case a court was willing to
entertain the argument if the plaintiffs could prove the factual predicates of
their claims.11
Thus, one cannot avoid thinking about the optimal regulation of
bailouts—if only to understand and criticize existing law.  At the same time,
the regulation of bailouts poses some special problems.  The source of a
bailout is often Congress itself, and so Congress may choose to disregard ear-
lier legislation that seeks to constrain it.  Even when a bailout comes from the
Fed or another agency, Congress might be reluctant to impose constraints on
it just because bailouts are by definition pursued in extraordinary, hard-to-
anticipate situations, unlike regular law enforcement.  For this reason, we will
propose bailout “principles” without taking a position on whether they can
be embodied in a statute.  Perhaps they can; but if they can’t, we will argue
that stated principles, even if not legally enforceable, may be a useful way to
structure the political response to bailouts.
In Part I, we provide a brief review of the legal literature on bailouts.  In
Part II, we discuss the idea of a bailout, and explain why it is useful to identify
it as a residual category of transfers that the government makes when existing
law “runs out.”  In Part III, we draw some lessons from notable bailouts—
from the financial crisis, and before.  Criticism of them can be divided into
four categories: they were not socially desirable from an ex post perspective;
they were unfair (they treated like people or firms unalike); they produced
moral hazard and other bad incentives for people who expect more bailouts
in the future; and they did not obey principles of procedural due process.
These lessons motivate our proposed Bailout Principles, which we discuss in
Part IV.  The Bailout Principles describe rules that maximize the likelihood
that bailouts will serve the public interest.
10 The question whether the government exceeded these constraints during the finan-
cial crisis bailouts is the subject of various ongoing lawsuits. See David Zaring, Litigating the
Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405 (2014).
11 See discussion infra Section III.E.
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I. BACKGROUND
Before the financial crisis, the legal literature on bailouts was sparse.  A
single article, written by Professor Cheryl Block, offered a framework for
thinking about certain bailouts.12  Block points out that bailouts are ex post
government interventions that may produce perverse incentives, but she
defines bailouts more broadly than we do to encompass insurance payouts
made pursuant to ex ante insurance schemes.13  So while Block ends up dis-
cussing how such insurance schemes should be designed,14 we focus on
payouts that are made in the absence of such schemes.
The post-financial crisis literature on bailouts is vast.  Most of the schol-
arship describes and evaluates specific bailouts,15 and does not attempt to
provide principles of bailout regulation, as we do.  Many scholars have also
written about the implications of the financial crisis for financial regulation,
bankruptcy law, and other insolvency regimes.16
12 Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND.
L.J. 951, 956–58 (1992).
13 Id. at 972–76 (discussing “prospective bailout” regimes).
14 Id. at 1033–34.
15 See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi & Anthony J. Casey, The Fannie and Freddie Bailouts Through
the Corporate Lens, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 443 (2014); Steven Davidoff Solomon & David
Zaring, After the Deal: Fannie, Freddie, and the Financial Crisis Aftermath, 95 B.U. L. REV. 371
(2015); Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727
(2010); see also Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009) (providing a descriptive exami-
nation of some of the government reactions to the financial crisis).
16 See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L.
469 (2010); Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2009);
Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of
Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic
Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008); see also Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of
Interest and Ethics When Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 131 (2009) (discuss-
ing the implication of the crisis and bailouts on theories of political corruption).  An enor-
mous amount has been written on the regulation and resolution of financial institutions
specifically.  Much of this literature is focused more on assessing the Dodd-Frank Act and
ex ante regulations to prevent the systemic spread of the failure of financial institutions.  It
is difficult, however, to separate this literature from bailout literature more broadly as the
two issues are so deeply intertwined after the financial crisis. See, e.g., John Armour &
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35 (2014);
Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293 (2012); Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case
for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151 (2011); Thomas H. Jackson &
David A. Skeel, Jr., Dynamic Resolution of Large Financial Institutions, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 435
(2012); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the
Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller,
Avoiding Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political Economy of Systemic Risk Management (Columbia Law
and Econ., Research Paper No. 369, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553880.
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A few scholars have begun exploring how bailouts should be regu-
lated.17  Professor Adam Levitin argues that a bailout system should have
“political accountability as the paramount institutional design goal”—by
which he means that a bailout should please the median voter—and offers
some design principles for ensuring that bailouts will be politically legiti-
mate.18  By contrast, we argue that bailouts should serve public policy
(should be “efficient,” in a broad sense); we assume that they will be politi-
cally legitimate if they are consistent with principles that tend to ensure effi-
ciency or good public policy.  Indeed, when the government enacts bad
policy in response to short-term public demand, its legitimacy can be hurt in
the long run.  This is especially true where, as in the case of bailouts, popular
preferences tend to exhibit significant temporal inconsistency.19
Professor Jeffrey Manns proposes to subject bailouts to a set of limita-
tions.20  He identifies three principles behind these limitations: (1) deterring
moral hazard; (2) recouping the government’s investment; and (3) linking
bailouts to governance reform.21  These principles lead him to propose an
investment fund—the Federal Government Investment Corporation
(FGIC)—with the limited power to make bailout funds available under cer-
tain conditions.22  The FGIC would have authority to invest in systemically
significant firms where it could certify that default raises systemic risk.23
Even with those thresholds met, the FGIC would be limited in implementing
the bailout.  The fund would be permitted to invest no more than 50% of the
equity value of any bailout recipient for a limited period of time.24  Creditors
would be required to take a haircut, and the bailout recipient would be
required to undergo corporate governance reforms.25
But the second and third principles are not proper goals of a bailout
system.26  While the performance of a government investment is one relevant
17 See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can
Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75 (2013); Adam J. Levitin, In
Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011); Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case
for a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349 (2011); see also generally Peter
Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409 (2012) (proposing an elec-
tive shareholder liability mechanism to reduce moral hazard and windfall problems inher-
ent in the operation bailouts of financial institutions).
18 Levitin, supra note 17, at 506.
19 See infra subsection III.F.4.
20 Manns, supra note 17, at 1383–84.
21 Id. at 1388.
22 Id. at 1383–84.
23 Id. at 1396.
24 Under this rule, the government has to take a share of convertible equity in the firm
that is proportional to the amount it invests.  And that share is limited to 50% of the firm’s
equity value. Id. at 1386–87.
25 Id. at 1388–89, 1391–92.
26 Manns’s first principle—deterring moral hazard—is one on which we agree.  But
Manns overweighs this principle’s importance.  He identifies moral hazard concerns as the
“key” to designing bailouts. Id. at 1388.  We suggest below that moral hazard can be a
concern in some but not all cases.  A narrow focus on moral hazard can obscure the other
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measure of ex post efficiency, it is not an end in itself.  A bailout that prevents
social losses of $100 billion at a cost of $5 billion for the government is a
socially beneficial bailout.  And while corporate governance reform is a valid
goal, a bailout is not a good time to implement it.  The government’s role as
a bailout monopolist gives it leverage over recipients, which lends itself to
abuse.  Moreover, because bailout decisions must typically be made with
great rapidity, officials do not have the time to evaluate a firm’s governance
structure and propose reforms.
Professors Iman Anabtawi and Steven Schwarcz argue that bailouts are
part of a necessary ex post system of financial regulation.27  In an analysis of
the broader question of financial regulation, they suggest that financial risk
must be regulated both through ex ante and ex post measures.28  Among the
necessary ex post measures, they include bailouts or “safety nets.”29  They
suggest that the power to provide safety nets should be institutionalized in a
standing government agency with the power to invest in firms that are too big
to fail.30  They identify some costs inherent in these safety nets—namely
moral hazard and false positives.  Beyond noting some of the ways that moral
hazard can be reduced,31 however, they do not provide guidelines for the
exercise of the bailout power.32
There is also a large economic literature on bailouts of financial firms
during liquidity crises.33  Most economists believe that the central bank
should make secured loans to illiquid but solvent financial institutions during
a liquidity crisis.34  When a bailout produces positive externalities (typically
principles of fairness, efficiency, and process that we identify.  Similarly we agree with
Manns that there are risks to ex post discretion, see id. at 1404–05, but his attempts to
prevent this through strict ex ante formulas for investment remove the value of bailouts
and relegates government power to those cases where bailouts are by definition
unnecessary.
27 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 17, at 102–12.
28 Id. at 131.
29 Id. at 77.
30 Id. at 106.  They argue that an existing authority, rather than an ad hoc response to
crisis, will “permit [safety net] design to be developed with the benefit of careful analysis”
and “provide a source of preexisting authority, as well as political legitimacy, to market
liquidity providers.” Id. at 112.
31 They identify haircuts and “a credible policy of constructive ambiguity” as measures
to reduce moral hazard. Id. at 124.
32 Their primary focus is on showing the tradeoff between ex ante and ex post regula-
tion rather than providing a prescriptive guide for implementing the various forms of ex
post regulation. Id. at 128–31.
33 See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT (Charles
Goodhart & Gerhard Illing eds., 2002); INT’L MONETARY FUND, FINANCIAL CRISES: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY RESPONSES (Stijn Claessens et al. eds., 2014); THE LENDER OF
LAST RESORT (Forrest H. Capie & Geoffrey E. Wood eds., 2007); Stanley Fischer, On the
Need for an International Lender of Last Resort, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1999).
34 See J. Bradford DeLong, This Time, It is Not Different: The Persistent Concerns of Finan-
cial Macroeconomics 13 (Apr. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Notre Dame
Law Review), http://delong.typepad.com/20120411-russell-sage-delong-paper.pdf.
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in the form of restoring liquidity to the market) that exceed moral hazard
costs, it is socially beneficial.35  Many economists and central bankers believe
that relatively clear rules are needed to govern bailouts in order to constrain
central banks and ensure that they maintain legitimacy in a democratic
system.36
Our article builds on this literature, but we try to derive a more detailed
set of principles for regulating bailouts, based on our interpretation of the
successes and problems with numerous bailouts that have taken place since
1970.  We draw on some of the insights in the economic literature, but our
approach is both more general—we look at all bailouts, not just financial
bailouts—and more specific—we propose rules for governing bailouts that
are attentive to legal norms and institutional structure.
II. WHAT IS A BAILOUT?
A. Definition
We define a “bailout” as an ex post government transfer (a loan, cash, or
other consideration) to an agent or group of agents to provide capital that is
otherwise unavailable because of liquidity constraints.  In most cases, this will
take the form of a transfer to prevent the agent from defaulting on debt, but
that is not a technical necessity.
1. Liquidity Constraints
  We stipulate that the bailout recipient faces liquidity problems in order to
distinguish a bailout from a regular transfer.  Consider a firm that makes
widgets and finances its operations with debt.  A cyclical downturn has
imposed a cash-flow shock on the firm.  Although the firm remains economi-
cally viable, it cannot pay its debts.  In a perfectly functioning capital market,
the firm would refinance its debts and continue operation without a
bailout.37  Any government transfer under these conditions would be a
subsidy.
Now assume that there is a simultaneous liquidity shock to the financial
markets that makes it impossible for the firm to raise the funds necessary to
continue.  This is the most straightforward case for a bailout.  The govern-
ment provides the liquidity to prevent an economically viable firm from
collapsing.
Still, a firm may in some cases be unable to raise capital even without
defaulting on prior debt.  Our widget company may have had an all-equity
35 See Antonio E. Bernardo et al., A Model of Optimal Government Bailouts (May 3,
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review), https://eschol
arship.org/uc/item/8wv4p90c.
36 See Paul Tucker, Independent Agencies in Democracies: Legitimacy and Boundaries
for the New Central Banks (2014) (unpublished manuscript).
37 To the extent there is a debt overhang problem, bankruptcy without a government
bailout could still facilitate the refinancing. See David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79
U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 687 (2012).
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capital structure.  That does not change the fact that when the cyclical down-
turn hits, it needs to raise funds for future operations.  Again, where capital is
unavailable, the government’s role as liquidity provider is implicated and a
transfer made in that role would be a bailout.
In contrast, a firm may be failing economically regardless of capital mar-
kets.  People may simply not want to buy widgets anymore at a price that
makes production worthwhile.  Any government transfer to the firm in that
situation is a mere subsidy.38
Complications pile up when we consider the possibility of indirect
bailouts.  A financially troubled widget firm may have numerous stakehold-
ers—employees, creditors, and others—who will be badly hurt if the firm
collapses.  The failure of the firm may cause a financial shock to the employ-
ees or counterparties.  Again, the problem exists only where an imperfection
in capital markets prevents counterparties from obtaining credit.  A laid-off
employee may not be able to finance her retraining; a counterparty on a
major contract or a creditor may not be able to raise enough capital to sur-
vive the cash-flow shock from the widget firm’s failure.  In these cases, the
government may want to bail out the employees or counterparties but it may
determine that the most cost-effective way to do this is to inject capital into
the widget firm.  This is (or could be, depending on how the bailout is struc-
tured) a wealth transfer or subsidy to the widget firm, but it is also an indirect
bailout to the employees or counterparties.39
This final example reveals two important points.  First, all bailouts are
ultimately about liquidity.  The government either bails out economically via-
ble liquidity-constrained firms or it indirectly bails out the liquidity-con-
strained stakeholders in a firm (when the firm may be insolvent).  Second,
distinguishing indirect bailouts from mere subsidies (especially for non-
financial firms) can be difficult as the distinction turns on whether the pur-
pose of the transfer is to prevent a liquidity crisis for the firm’s stakeholders.
And the likelihood that such a liquidity crisis would result from the firm’s
collapse is difficult to measure.  Thus, the assertion that the government is
making the transfer for that purpose can rarely be proven or refuted with any
certainty.
2. Ex Post
The second feature of the definition just laid out is that the bailout must
come ex post—as a transfer that was not paid for in advance, as in the case of
38 We will see below that critics of the auto bailout claimed that they were, in fact,
subsidies of this kind.  The government took the contrary position.  Our view is that intent
matters.  A transfer to a firm everyone knows is economically failed is not a bailout.  A
bailout to a firm that is thought by the government to be viable but turns out to be failed is
a misguided or bad bailout.  As the auto bailouts highlight, actual intent can be difficult to
discover.  This argues in favor of some of the guiding principles to minimize abuse of
discretion that we advocate below.
39 One could also have an indirect bailout of the counterparties of the counterparties
(and so on).
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insurance.40  Ex ante safety nets are insurance rather than bailouts.  To be
clear about this point, imagine a timeline in which an agent makes an invest-
ment at time one, and the investment is realized as a success or failure at time
two.  If the government believes that the investment should be subsidized, it
may offer a tax break, loan guarantee, or other subsidy to the agent before
time one.  Such a subsidy is not a bailout.  By contrast, if the investment fails
at time two, and then the government makes a transfer to the agent to pre-
vent it from defaulting on its obligations, a bailout has occurred.
The clearest example of government insurance is the FDIC program.41
Banks pay premiums for this insurance, and in return depositors are entitled
to compensation from the FDIC of up to $250,000 if the bank is unable to
pay them.  FDIC insurance, in principle, is not a subsidy because banks must
pay premiums; thus, the payment to the depositors is not a bailout.  Moreo-
ver, even if FDIC insurance is underpriced, as is sometimes argued,42 the
payouts are not bailouts because depositors have a legal right to the payouts.
The underpricing of FDIC insurance is just a typical ex ante subsidy.
By contrast, the Fed’s power under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act does give the Fed the power to make bailouts.43  Under section 13(3),
the Fed can make below-market loans to illiquid non-bank institutions.44
These institutions do not make ex ante payments to the Fed, and have no
legal entitlement to the loans, so section 13(3) cannot be classified as an
insurance program.  The purpose of a section 13(3) loan is to enable the
borrower to pay its debts; hence, a section 13(3) loan is a bailout.45
An interesting middle case is the Fed’s power to make discount-window
loans to banks under section 10(b).46  The banks that receive these loans
make mandatory capital contributions to a Federal Reserve Bank, but these
contributions are not priced to reflect future need for loans.  On the other
hand, banks do pay interest on the loans ex post, and must submit ex ante to
regulation.  Legally, the loans are discretionary rather than as of right; yet
banks expect them and the Fed has a legal obligation to use the discount
window to end banking panics.  For this reason, section 10(b) loans fall
somewhere between a pure bailout and an insurance payout.
This two-part definition can be applied to distinguish close cases.  Under
our definition, government loans to victims of natural disasters should be
classified as bailouts to the extent that those loans are designed to enable
40 On the difference between ex post and ex ante legal norms, see Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 571–77 (1992).
41 Who is the FDIC?, FDIC (Oct. 30. 2014), https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/.
42 George G. Pennacchi, A Reexamination of the Over- (or Under-) Pricing of Deposit Insur-
ance, 19 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 340 (1987).
43 Federal Reserve Act, § 13(3) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)).
44 Id.
45 Not everyone agrees that an emergency loan of this type should be called a
“bailout.”  For example, the former central banker Paul Tucker uses “bailout” to refer only
to loans to insolvent firms. See Tucker, supra note 36, at 40.  We use the term more broadly
than he does, following popular usage.
46 Federal Reserve Act, § 10(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 347).
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victims to avoid defaulting on debts.  People do not pay ex ante for the legal
right to these payments, so disaster programs are not insurance.  At the same
time, transfers to victims of natural disasters are not always designed to
address the financial shock created by the disaster or enable the people to
pay off their debts.  Their general purpose is often humanitarian compensa-
tion rather than macroeconomic intervention.  So natural disaster relief lies
close to the borderline of our definition.47
3. Targeted
In practice, people refer to bailouts as transfers that are made to specific
firms or an industry.  This feature of our definition is not essential to it; in
principle, the government could bail out the entire economy.  When the Fed
reduces interest rates, it provides just such a bailout—an ex post transfer in
the form of liquidity, which benefits banks and ideally encourages them to
lend to businesses and consumers.48
Some economists support such open-market operations while opposing
bailouts.49  They are bothered not so much by ex post government interven-
tion but by targeted intervention that may be influenced by political
considerations.
Bailouts can take other forms as well.  In 2008, the Fed purchased com-
mercial paper from eligible firms.50  In doing so, it provided low-cost liquid-
ity to a class of firms.  The Fed’s actions kept them alive but did not fully bail
them out.  We refer to this type of support as a “partial bailout.”
B. Disguised Bailouts
The definition can be difficult to apply where the transfer itself is dis-
guised or hidden.  We call these transfers “disguised bailouts.”  They take
place without an explicit transfer of consideration to a firm.  In the Savings &
Loan (S&L) crisis, regulators initially tried to rescue insolvent firms by
encouraging solvent firms to buy them.  Since the insolvent firms had nega-
47 Many of the questions that arise in the bailout context—such as moral hazard, dis-
cretion, and political favoritism—are similar to those that arise in the context of disaster
relief. See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules Rather than Discretion: Lessons from
Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 101 (2006).  There are, therefore, many paral-
lels between the analysis we present and the literature on disaster relief. See, e.g., Janet
Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 627
(2003) (identifying important principles for designing terror-victim relief programs).  But
there are important differences between disaster relief and bailouts.  Chief among them is
the fact that bailouts, properly understood, are designed exclusively to contain
macroeconomic risk, while disaster relief may be defended on humanitarian or distributive
grounds even where it does not reduce externalities or prevent further economic loss.
48 A similar response would be to relax regulations during periods of high unemploy-
ment. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 98 VA. L. REV. 579 (2012).
49 Fischer, supra note 33, at 91.
50 See infra subsection III.E.2.
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tive value, the regulators “paid” the solvent firms in the form of regulatory
forbearance—promising not to enforce certain regulations against them.
Since those regulations imposed costs on the firms in question, regulatory
forbearance amounted to a transfer of value.  As another example, the gov-
ernment in 1998 bailed out the creditors of the hedge fund Long-Term Capi-
tal Management by persuading all of them to agree to haircuts.  The
government did not pay money to anyone, but it did manage to force firms to
act against their inclination.  How it did so is not clear.  The government has
enormous regulatory power over banks—it can, for example, block mergers
and extensions of certain lines of business.  The government might have
implicitly bribed banks by promising to approve future mergers that it would
not otherwise have approved; or it might have implicitly threatened not to
approve future mergers that it would otherwise have approved.  In either
case, the government effected a bailout.
Or, consider, as a final example, the argument that the government
bailed out the steel industry in 2002 by imposing trade barriers on foreign
imports.51  The trade barriers artificially raised the price of steel in the
United States, which resulted in greater revenues for the steel industry.  This
is economically not much different from taxing consumers and using the
proceeds to bail out the industry.  While we focus in this Article on explicit
bailouts, it is important to see that if bailouts are understood in a functional
way, they may well be ubiquitous rather than rare.
C. Direct and Indirect Beneficiaries of Bailouts
As noted above, the beneficiaries of the bailout are not always the direct
recipients of the transfer.  Imagine two Banks, X and Y.  Bank X owns $100 in
illiquid assets, and owes $90 in the form of a demand deposit to Bank Y.
Bank Y has a single asset, the demand deposit with X worth $90, and owes
$80 to its own depositors.  Both banks have equity of $10.  During a liquidity
crisis, Bank Y might attempt to withdraw its $90 from Bank X, which would
drive X into bankruptcy if it cannot sell its assets for that much, as is likely.  If
Bank X collapses and can only raise, say, $50, to give to Bank Y, then Bank Y
will also collapse—because it cannot afford to pay its depositors.
Suppose the government bails out Bank X by lending it $90.  Bank X can
repay Y, and thus stay in business long enough to sell its illiquid assets or
obtain new creditors.  Thus, it is easy to see that the government saves Bank
X.  But the government also saves Bank Y.  By enabling Bank X to pay back
Bank Y in full, the government also enables Bank Y to pay its depositors.  The
bailout of X is direct; the bailout of Y is indirect, but no less real.
The government could also save X by bailing out Y.  If the government
lends $80 to Y so that Y can pay back its depositors, then Y may feel no need
51 See Raymond Hernandez, Santorum, Defender of Free Market, Pushed in Congress to Pro-
tect Big Steel, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/us/politics/
santorum-free-market-defender-used-to-aid-steel-industry.html.
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to withdraw its $90 from X.  In this case the government bails out Y directly,
and X indirectly.
This distinction is important because even though the actions are func-
tionally identical, often the public identifies only the direct recipient as the
beneficiary of the bailout, and may put pressure on the government to pun-
ish direct recipients but not to punish indirect recipients.  In the first case,
for example, the government might respond to public pressure by demand-
ing that X pay a high interest rate to the government, or give it equity.  X is
penalized, and Y is not, but Y is just as much a beneficiary of government
action as X is.
Insiders and sophisticated commentators, by contrast, are well aware of
this phenomenon.  When the U.S. government participated in the bailout of
Mexico in 1994, experts understood that major beneficiaries were U.S. banks,
including Citigroup, whose loans to Mexico were at stake.52  Indeed, stock
prices of U.S. banks with exposure to the crisis responded to announcements
of progress and setbacks in the U.S. bailout talks.53
Similarly, when the government bailed out AIG, it wiped out most of
AIG’s equity, which was politically popular.  But the indirect beneficiaries of
the bailout—AIG’s creditors and counterparties—did not suffer any loss in
equity.  Critics of the AIG bailout accused the government of engaging in a
“backdoor bailout” of AIG’s counterparties.54  Similarly, the indirect benefi-
ciaries of the GM and Chrysler bailouts of 2009 were employee-creditors,
while shareholders—the nominal direct beneficiaries—were wiped out.55
D. The Structure of a Bailout
The government has many degrees of freedom when designing a
bailout, and can use this freedom to favor or discriminate against various
stakeholders.  Imagine a firm like GM on the brink of default.  The govern-
52 See NOMI PRINS, ALL THE PRESIDENTS’ BANKERS 374 (2014) (“Heavy hitters like
BankAmerica, Chase Manhattan, Chemical Banking, Citicorp, Goldman Sachs, and J. P.
Morgan . . . accounted for nearly 74 percent of Latin American exposure, or $40.4 billion.
The bailout saved them, and later enabled them to buy Mexican banks that were weakened
as a result.  A decade later, foreign banks, led by Citigroup in the United States, owned 74
percent of Mexican financial assets . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  Rubin’s public position was
that the bailout was a regrettable necessity: “Alan, Larry, and I all opposed making the
holders of [Mexican short-term obligations] whole.  But we concluded—I think rightly—
that Mexico couldn’t be rescued without the side effect of helping some investors.” ROB-
ERT E. RUBIN & JACOB WEISBERG, IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: TOUGH CHOICES FROM WALL
STREET TO WASHINGTON 11–12 (2004).  Not everyone was convinced. See, e.g., ANDREW
ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 51 (2010) (referring to “accusations at the time that Rubin
had actually organized the international bailout in an effort to save Goldman Sachs”).
53 See Osman Kilic et al., An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Bank Risk and the Mexican Peso
Crisis, 22 J. ECON. & FIN. 139, 144–45 (1998) (finding that stocks of U.S. banks with expo-
sure to Mexican loans experienced abnormal positive and negative returns in responses to
announcements of progress and setbacks, respectively, in U.S. bailout talks).
54 See infra subsection III.F.2.
55 See infra subsection III.E.3.
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ment could lend GM enough money to pay off its creditors.  This loan bene-
fits those creditors, who otherwise would be partially repaid from GM’s assets;
and shareholders, who retain the value of their equity.  The bailout benefits
all creditors.
However, the government could also offer a loan that provides more
limited benefits.  For example, it could demand that all creditors receive
haircuts, and that shareholder equity be diluted or even wiped out.  It can
also discriminate within groups.  In the GM loan, for example, the govern-
ment ensured that employees as pension creditors received higher payoffs as
a fraction of their claims than other creditors.  Dealers brought a lawsuit
claiming that the government discriminated against them by requiring GM to
terminate its contractual relationships with them.  The government also
wiped out the shareholders.
The government treated financial institutions with a great deal of varia-
tion as well.  Many banks received emergency loans from the Fed that fully
preserved shareholder value.  Banks that received Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (TARP) money had to submit to various dilutions of shareholder
equity.  Bear Stearns and AIG shareholders also were subject to bespoke dilu-
tions.  One important issue concerned whether the government should
obtain equity in a firm that it bails out.  Before the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act (EESA), the government took equity only from AIG; after
EESA, using the authorizations in that statute, the government received
equity from financial institutions into which it pumped TARP money.56
While the question whether the government should take equity or not is
outside the scope of this Article, we should note some of the relevant consid-
erations.  The justification for taking equity is that it gives the government,
and hence the taxpayer, the upside if the target firm recovers; this compen-
sates the government for the risk that it takes.  Moreover, equity may give the
government control over the firm, which allows it to influence the firm’s
operations and hence maximize the probability of repayment.  And by reduc-
ing payoffs to shareholders, equity transfers may counter moral hazard.  But
there are also fears that the government will abuse control of corporations
for political purposes.  Since World War II, in the United States (unlike many
other countries) the government has avoided taking a controlling share of
equity in corporations because of political opposition toward government
meddling in industry.57  The government can protect itself from default with
56 See, e.g., Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation’s Largest Banks, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122390023840728367; Ryan Tracy et al.,
Hedge Funds, Private Equity Win Big at TARP Auctions, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-funds-private-equity-win-big-at-tarp-auctions-1422421201.
57 See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 388–90 (1995) (recounting
the rise of government corporations during the world wars and Great Depression, and the
subsequent actions to reverse that trend).  The current prohibition on government-con-
trolled corporations is embodied in the Government Corporation Control Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 1105, 9101–9110 (2012), which prohibits agencies from establishing or acquiring corpo-
rations without congressional consent.
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devices that are less subject to abuse, like loan covenants.  One might also
worry that the government could use emergency conditions to take an exces-
sively large equity interest because firms that would otherwise go bankrupt
lack the bargaining power that would be necessary to ensure that terms are
fair.
E. Who Makes the Bailout?
Because of their ex post nature, one might think that Congress must
make bailouts by appropriating funds and distributing them to beneficiaries.
In fact, Congress has in a number of statutes delegated the power to make
bailouts to other entities—above all, the Fed.58  Section 10(b) of the Federal
Reserve Act gives the Fed the power to quasi–bail out banks, and section
13(3) gives the Fed the power to bail out non-bank financial institutions.59
The Fed has this power in part as a result of its unique ability to fund itself
from its operations.  The FDIC also has a traditional power to make bailouts
by rescuing banks that pose a systemic threat; in these cases, the FDIC may
pay all of the bank’s creditors to the full extent of their claims, not just depos-
itors who are covered by insurance.60  The FDIC has a fund, paid for through
its regular assessments on banks that it can draw on to make such payments.
Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to borrow from Treasury in order to make
bailouts if the fund is depleted.61
The difference between a congressional bailout and an agency bailout is
important because Congress can regulate agency bailouts by putting appro-
priate conditions in the statute.  Dodd-Frank does just that—by requiring
that consulting and approval take place in the executive branch, and limiting
the power of the Fed to bail out individual firms (as opposed to classes of
firms).62  By contrast, any effort by Congress to regulate itself by issuing
restrictions on its own bailouts in advance runs into time-inconsistency
problems.  If Congress enacts a statute restricting or regulating bailouts at
time one, and then enacts another statute at time two that authorizes a
bailout, it can explicitly or implicitly repeal the time one statute in the pro-
cess.  Nonetheless, a general bailout statute at time one may not be easy to
overturn.  An explicit overturning of the statute may be politically embarrass-
ing, and courts may not recognize an implicit overturning, reasoning instead
58 See 12 U.S.C. § 347b (2012).
59 See id. § 343.
60 See id. § 1823(c)(4)(G).  For a description of how the systemic risk exception has
been used, see generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-100, FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE ACT: REGULATORS’ USE OF SYSTEMIC RISK EXCEPTION RAISES MORAL HAZ-
ARD CONCERNS AND OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO CLARIFY THE PROVISION (2010), http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d10100.pdf.
61 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 210, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5390(n)(1).
62 See id. §§ 5383, 5343.
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that the first statute is meant to structure the second statute.63  There are
many analogies to this style of reasoning; for example, the Supreme Court’s
refusal to hold that the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
against Al Qaeda implicitly overturned statutes that regulate surveillance and
other matters.64
F. Some Recent Bailouts
Bailouts might seem extraordinarily rare, but they are not.  In the table
below, we list ten bailouts from the last forty years—one every four years.
The table does not include the bailout of New York City in 1975, or the vari-
ous bailouts of sovereigns—like Mexico in 1995—that benefited American
holders of foreign debt.  Arguably, when the Fed lowers interest rates in
order to head off a financial crisis—as it did starting in 2007—it is engaging
in a kind of bailout of all firms that, as a consequence, can borrow money
more cheaply than otherwise.  However, in popular usage, bailouts are
targeted to individual firms or classes of firms, and we will stick to that usage.
The bailouts differ in many ways.  In some cases, the government bailed
out multiple firms in whole industries—the S&L bailout and the bailouts of
2008–2009.  In other cases, it bailed out single firms.  Bailouts took different
forms—as cash transfers, loans, and loan guarantees.  Bailouts can also be
disguised, which is why we include the bailout of Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment in 1998 when the government did not spend any money but may have
used an implicit promise of regulatory forbearance in order to persuade
creditors to agree to haircuts.65  The government bailed out financial firms
for the most part, but also bailed out manufacturing firms and transport
firms.
TABLE 1: SOME RECENT BAILOUTS66
AMOUNT SPENT ORYEAR BENEFICIARY OUTCOMELOANED BY GOVERNMENT
1970 Penn Central Railroad $557 Million Reorganized
1971 Lockheed $245 Million Recovered
1974 Franklin Bank $1.75 Billion Liquidated
1980 Chrysler $1.2 Billion Recovered
1984 Continental Bank $4.5 Billion Liquidated
1989 Savings & Loan Industry $132 Billion Liquidated
Long-Term Capital1998 $0 LiquidatedManagement
2001 Airline Industry $6.56 Billion Industry recovered
Financial Sector and2008–2009 $534 Billion Industry recoveredHomeowners
2008 Chrysler & GM $80 Billion Reorganized
63 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1235
(2001).
64 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593–94 (2006).
65 See supra Section II.B.
66 The information in the table is compiled from the following sources.  Air
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The table provides a very rough description of the outcome in each case.
We will provide details of several bailouts in Part III, but it is worth pointing
out here that most of the bailouts were at least superficially successful.  In
most cases, the government broke even or made substantial profits on loans
and other investments; and the bailed-out firm or industry recovered.  But all
the bailouts were intensely controversial.  Why they were is the topic of the
next Part.
III. CASE STUDIES
We discuss below a number of the bailouts in Table 1.  As we will see,
criticisms of most of these bailouts fall into four categories.  First, critics fre-
quently argue that a proposed bailout is what we will call “ex post ineffi-
cient”—a pure transfer to a lucky group of stakeholders that does not
produce a net social good and wastes the taxpayers’ dollars.  Second, bailouts
often appear unfair or discriminatory because they help one group of people
while the government does not help similarly situated people—stakeholders
in other firms that do not receive a bailout.  Third, bailouts might generate
moral hazard by creating the expectation that in the future other firms will
receive bailouts, an expectation that may distort the incentives of market
agents.  Fourth, critics sometimes argue that the government has issued a
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 101(a)(2), 115
Stat. 230, 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)); BILL CANIS &
BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41978, THE ROLE OF TARP ASSISTANCE IN THE
RESTRUCTURING OF GENERAL MOTORS 5–6 (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R41978.pdf.; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL,
SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE SUPPORT AND
REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY (2009); JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40005, CHRYSLER CORPORATION LOAN GUARANTEE ACT OF 1979:
BACKGROUND, PROVISIONS, AND COST 4 (2008); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-
836, COMMERCIAL AVIATION: LEGACY AIRLINES MUST FURTHER REDUCE COSTS TO RESTORE
PROFITABILITY (2004), http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/243741.pdf; THE PRESIDENT’S
WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 13–14 (1999), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/
Documents/hedgfund.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/AIMD-96-123, FINANCIAL
AUDIT: RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION’S 1995 AND 1994 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 13
(1996); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PSAD-78-66, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMERGENCY
LOAN GUARANTEE ACT (1978) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, CED-76-161, IMPROVED CONTROLS NEEDED OVER FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO
RAILROADS 5–6, 8, 10, 15 (1976); Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and
Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 31 (2000); Kate McDermott
et al., Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, in MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE
FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 1980–1994, at 560 (1998); Deborah Groban Olson, Fair
Exchange: Providing Citizens with Equity Managed by a Community Trust, in Return for
Government Subsidies or Tax Breaks for Businesses, 15 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 231, 286–88
(2006); Anna J. Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed’s Discount Window, 74 FED. RES. BANK OF ST.
LOUIS REV. 58, 64 (1992); Paul Kiel & Dan Nguyen, Bailout Tracker, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 2,
2015) http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/.
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bailout in a procedurally irregular way—with insufficient transparency and
inadequate opportunities for stakeholders and others to make their views
known about the wisdom of the bailout or how it should be structured.
A. The Lockheed Bailout
In the early 1970s, Lockheed Corporation, an important aerospace man-
ufacturer (one of the companies that later merged to form today’s Lockheed
Martin), ran into financial difficulties when a major project ran over budget
and one of its suppliers filed for bankruptcy.  Lockheed argued that if it were
forced into bankruptcy, its failure would damage the airline industry and
cause massive job losses in California.67  As the nation’s largest defense con-
tractor,68 Lockheed was also vital to the war effort in Vietnam.  Congress
responded to Lockheed’s pleas by enacting the Emergency Loan Guarantee
Act, under which the government provided Lockheed with a $250 million
loan guarantee.
Supporters of the bailout emphasized the macroeconomic costs of bank-
ruptcy.69  President Nixon argued that a Lockheed failure would destroy
jobs.70  The Secretary of the Treasury added that Lockheed’s most recent
troubles were not its fault but had resulted in part from government cancella-
tions of major projects.71  Unions and banks also warned of the negative
macroeconomic effects of a Lockheed failure.72
Critics of a bailout argued that the macroeconomic effects of failure
would be small, while the bailout would be costly for the government.  A
representative of the United Auto Workers union testified that the lost pro-
duction of Lockheed would be picked up by McDonnell Douglas, which
“would be highly advantageous to the American aerospace worker.”73  A
report by the majority staff of the House Banking and Currency Committee
67 See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., B-169300, IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY
LOAN GUARANTEE ACT (1972), http://gao.gov/assets/210/203532.pdf.
68 Id. at 6.
69 Divisions did not follow party lines.  Republicans in the Senate voted 27-17 for the
bill while Democrats voted 22-31 against and Southern Democrats split 9-8 for in the Sen-
ate.  The divisions in the House were similar. Lockheed Loan Guarantee Bill Cleared on Close
Votes, 27 CONG.Q. ALMANAC 1971 (1972), http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/docu
ment.php?id=cqal71-1252844.
70 Id. (“President Nixon at San Clemente, Calif., May 5 told a news conference the
major factor, in his view, was the unemployment that would be caused by a Lockheed
bankruptcy and consequent abandonment of the L-1011 program.”).
71 See id.  The chairman of Bank of America, a major lender to Lockheed, also testified
to Congress that “[t]o a great extent, the federal government shares responsibility and thus
the federal government has an obligation to assist the firm through its present liquidity
crisis.” Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. (quoting Joel R. Jacobson, Director of Community Relations, Region 9, United
Auto Workers).
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found a “substantial risk of default and loss to the government in the pro-
posed guarantee.”74
Critics and defenders also argued about the general propriety of
bailouts.  The Fed sought permanent authority for the government to issue
loan guarantees.75  On the other side, Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin noted
his opposition to “insulating big business from failure.”76  He pointed out
that none of the more than 10,000 small businesses that failed in 1970 were
being bailed out.77  Other testimony highlighted the moral hazard problem,
noting that the failures at hand raised a presumption of mismanagement.78
In the end, the bill passed.  Ostensibly, it authorized loan guarantees to
all troubled firms whose failure would have systemic effects.  The Act created
a Loan Guarantee Board and provided that it could guarantee a loan only
if—
(1) the Board finds that (A) the loan is needed to enable the borrower to
continue to furnish goods or services and failure to meet this need would
adversely and seriously affect the economy of or employment in the Nation
or any region thereof, (B) credit is not otherwise available to the borrower
under reasonable terms or conditions, and (C) the prospective earning
power of the borrower, together with the character and value of the security
pledged, furnish reasonable assurance that it will be able to repay the loan
within the time fixed, and afford reasonable protection to the United States;
and
(2) the lender certifies that it would not make the loan without such
guarantee.79
But Lockheed was the only firm to apply for or receive assistance under
the Act.80  The amount of guaranteed loans topped out at $245 million in
1974.81  The loan guarantee was terminated in 1977 as part of a refinancing
that replaced the government-supported loans.82  The government earned
$25.5 million in commitment fees.83
74 Id.
75 Id. (“Developments over the past year or so have underscored the need for standby
authority for government guarantees of loans to business firms in emergencies where the
alternative could be severe damage to the national economy . . . .” (quoting Arthur F.
Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System)).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. (summarizing the testimony of Senator Cranston of California who had pro-
posed requiring the management to resign as a condition for the bailout).
79 Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-70, § 4, 85 Stat. 178, 178 (1971).
The Act was originally codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1843(a) until December 31, 1973, when
authority of the Board to enter into any guarantee or make any commitments terminated.
Id. § 13, 85 Stat. at 182.
80 IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 66, at 1.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 2.  The Board reported receiving $26,503,683 in fees with costs of $983,094.
During the course of the program, the Board invested the fees it received in government
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The Lockheed controversy set the terms of the debates for future
bailouts.  First, critics thought that the macroeconomic benefits of a bailout
would be slim and the government would lose money.  While we do not know
whether they were correct on the first point, they were wrong on the second.
Second, critics argued that the bailout was unfair because other firms did not
receive bailouts, and Lockheed benefited from its political connections.
Questions also arose as to whether the bailout could or should be structured
to be distributively fair.  Third, the question of moral hazard arose as partici-
pants debated whether Lockheed or the government was at fault for Lock-
heed’s financial distress, and whether one bailout would give rise to
additional bailouts.84
B. 1979 Chrysler Bailout
In 1979 Chrysler had lost over a billion dollars.  It had “negative working
capital” and was unable to borrow on the market.85  Congress and the White
House responded by negotiating a bailout program that would inject $1.5
billion of capital into the firm through a government guarantee.  The gov-
ernment agency administering the guarantee estimated that the failure of
Chrysler would “lower GNP by $5 billion in 1980 and $6 billion in 1981.”86
Between 700,000 and 800,000 jobs and the solvency of the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation were also put at risk.87  The job-loss estimates were
challenged by critics who argued that lost production by Chrysler would be
picked up by the other Detroit automakers.88
The bailout took the form of a loan guarantee approved by the Chrysler
Corporation Loan Guarantee Act.89  Up to $1.5 billion was made available in
securities and reported an additional $4.9 million in revenue from interest on those invest-
ments. Id.
84 While eight years passed between the Lockheed bailout and the Chrysler bailout,
critics argued that the first set the stage for the second by rewarding bad management.  For
example, when the Chicago Tribune ran an editorial criticizing the 1979 Chrysler bailout,
it stated, “As we and others warned at the time, the $250 million in federal loan guarantees
to Lockheed in 1971 has set a bad precedent.  It says in effect that big business needn’t
worry if it doesn’t function efficiently enough to stay competitive.  The government will be
there to rescue inefficient or uneconomic enterprises.”  Editorial, It’s Still a Bailout, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 11, 1979, at 8.
85 Chrysler Records History-Making Losses, THE ARGUS-PRESS (Owosso, MI), Feb. 8, 1980,
at 4.
86 Paul H. Wilson, Jr. & Peter L. Borowitz, Working Out with the Government: The Chrysler
Loan Guarantee Program, 4 J.L. & COM. 19, 21 (1984) (quoting CHRYSLER CORP. LOAN GUAR-
ANTEE BD., FINDINGS OF THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD 11 (1980),
http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/002948769).
87 BICKLEY, supra note 66, at 2.  There were some national security arguments as well
because Chrysler manufactured a major battle tank for the military. Id.
88 Id.
89 Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1980).  The Act was originally codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1861–75, 631 until December 31, 1983, when the authority of the Board to make
commitments expired. Id. § 16, 93 Stat. at 1335.
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guarantees.  The Act required that additional funds of at least $1.43 billion
be raised from non-federal sources, and that some of those funds would
come in the form of haircuts on existing stakeholders.90  Thus, existing
domestic lenders were required to provide $400 million in new loans and
$100 million in concessions on existing loans.  The remaining funds were to
be contributed by foreign lenders ($150 million), state and local govern-
ments ($250 million), suppliers and dealers ($180 million), proceeds from
asset sales ($300 million), and the issuance of new equity ($50 million).91  An
additional $587.5 million in concessions were required from employees, pri-
marily in reduced compensation for union employees.92
Chrysler was the nation’s tenth largest company;93 and its financial
problems posed a greater risk to the economy than Lockheed’s did.  As in
Lockheed, the debate about the wisdom of a bailout centered on ex post
efficiency, fairness, moral hazard, and the likelihood of failure.  Ralph Nader
noted,
Opponents of the Chrysler bill filled their recitals with arguments that it
was a bad precedent, that it was unfair to thousands of failing small busi-
nesses which are not given federal bail-outs, that the loan guarantee would
not be enough to save Chrysler as a full-line auto manufacturer, that
Chrysler could reorganize and scale down to a smaller, efficient company,
and that the taxpayers shouldn’t be required to do what the banks would not
do.94
  However, at least in hindsight, we can say that the bailout was a success: it
both saved Chrysler and generated a profit for the government.  Chrysler
took $1.2 billion in guaranteed loans and redeemed them all by 1982.95  In
exchange for its guarantee, the government took a security interest in
Chrysler’s assets, and received an annual 1% guarantee fee.  The government
also took warrants to purchase shares that represented 10% to 15% of
Chrysler’s common stock.  Those warrants were sold after Chrysler recovered
and functioned as an additional $311 million fee that the government col-
lected on its guarantee.96  However, some critics argue that the government
made money on the bailout only because it imposed import quotas that artifi-
90 Id. §§ 4(a)(4), 4(a)(6), 93 Stat. at 1326 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1863 (2012)). But
see text accompanying note 79.
91 Id. § 4(c), 93 Stat. at 1327 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1863). But see text accompanying
note 79.
92 Id. § 6(a), 93 Stat. at 1329 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1865). But see text accompanying
note 79.
93 Brian M. Freeman & Allan I. Mendelowitz, Program in Search of a Policy: The Chrysler
Loan Guarantee, 1 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 443, 445 (1982).
94 Ralph Nader, Free Enterprise Undermined in Chrysler Bailout, THE NADER PAGE (Dec. 30,
1979), https://blog.nader.org/1979/12/30/free-enterprise-undermined-in-chrysler-
bailout/.
95 BICKLEY, supra note 66, at 4.
96 Wilson & Borowitz, supra note 86, at 37–38.
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cially inflated Chrysler’s sales—in effect, taxing car buyers.97  If so, the
bailout may not have been ex post efficient.
The charge of unfairness cannot be so easily dismissed.  Critics saw no
sense in imposing haircuts on creditors and employees in order to transfer
value to shareholders who would have otherwise been wiped out.98  The head
of GM criticized the bailout as favoring a failed competitor: “If you say, ‘O.K.,
if somebody fails in the competitive race, then we’re going to bail them out
anyway,’ I don’t think that’s in accordance with what really made this country
great.”99  Economist John Kenneth Galbraith lamented the power of corpo-
rations to secure favorable treatment: “Even the finest and firmest free enter-
prise principles, we know, can be bent as needed to pecuniary and corporate
need.”100  He also commented that if the bailout was inevitable, the public
should at least have received an ownership stake in the firm.
Finally, worries of moral hazard loomed large.  Many of those leveling
fairness objections tied them to moral hazard.  A Business Week editorial
argued that the bailout “would set the dangerous precedent of relieving the
management, the board of directors, and the stockholders of responsibility
for the company’s good health.”101  Congress sought to address this concern
by imposing haircuts on employees and creditors.  Perhaps the moral hazard
(and unfairness concerns) raised at the time would have been reduced if
Congress had imposed a greater cost on shareholders.  But once again, the
moral hazard claims are at best theoretical possibilities.  There is no evidence
that the Chrysler bailout caused other firms to engage in mismanagement or
risky investments.
C. S&L Bailouts
In the 1980s, a large number of bank-like financial institutions known as
Savings & Loans (S&Ls) and Savings Banks collapsed.102  S&Ls (and Savings
Banks, but henceforth we will refer to both types of bank as S&Ls or thrifts)
were a type of bank that mainly served consumers by issuing mortgages to
homeowners and offering checking accounts.  They mostly stayed out of
commercial lending and deposit-taking.  The thrift industry was a stable and
profitable business from the Depression until the 1970s.  In the 1970s, inter-
97 See BICKLEY, supra note 66, at 1.
98 James K. Hickel, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER NO. 276, The Chrysler Bail-out
Bust, at 1, 2 (1983), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1983/07/the-chrysler-bail-
out-bust (arguing that the only difference between a bailout and a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
was the value retained by shareholders that gambled on a bailout and won).
99 Editorial, Asides: Mr. Murphy Is Right, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1979, at 10.
100 The Chrysler Loan, in MANUEL G. VELASQUEZ, BUSINESS ETHICS: CONCEPTS AND CASES
(7th ed. 2012).
101 Editorial, Chrysler: No Bailout, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 20, 1979, at 132.
102 For accounts, see, for example, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, The Sav-
ings and Loan Crisis and Its Relationship to Banking, in HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES—LESSONS
FOR THE FUTURE 178–81 (1997), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/
167_188.pdf.
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est rates rose sharply because of budget deficits, the oil shock, and other
adverse market conditions.  In addition, the government permitted money
market mutual funds to offer checking-like services to consumers and to pay
them a market interest rate.  S&Ls initially lost business to the mutual funds
because they were not permitted to charge a high rate of interest.  The gov-
ernment responded by allowing S&Ls to charge a market interest rate, but
now the problem was that the interest rates demanded by depositors
exceeded the very low interest rates on the thirty-year mortgages that the
S&Ls had issued when interest rates were very low.  As a result of this squeeze,
many S&Ls became undercapitalized and possibly insolvent.
Congress, state legislatures (which established rules of state S&Ls, as
opposed to nationally chartered S&Ls), and regulators responded in the
early 1980s by further deregulating S&Ls.103  They hoped that by allowing
S&Ls to diversify into different markets, such as commercial real estate, and
to offer new types of loans, like adjustable-rate mortgages, they would enable
S&Ls to return to profitability.  Unfortunately, deregulation caused many
S&Ls to take on additional risk.  Many S&Ls expanded their operations in
order to enter the new markets.  To do so, they needed additional sources of
funds, which they obtained by offering increasingly high interest rates for
deposits.  Because of deposit insurance, depositors did not pay attention to
the credit risk of the S&Ls in which they put their funds.  Many S&Ls used
this money to make risky loans that went sour, and as a consequence hun-
dreds of S&Ls collapsed.104
S&L regulators initially tried to rescue failing S&Ls by persuading
healthy S&Ls and banks to buy them.105  Because no one wants to buy a firm
with negative value, the regulators compensated the buyers by offering to
excuse them from various regulatory requirements.  However, this strategy
just weakened the healthy institutions, and Congress put an end to it—in the
process making the government liable for breach of contract.106  Congress
finally cleaned up the mess by authorizing regulators to borrow enough
funds to pay off depositors and hold the assets of the failed S&Ls until they
could be sold off at market prices.  By the end of the crisis, hundreds of
thrifts had failed.  The total cost of the rescue has been estimated at $160
billion.107
103 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Garn-St Germain Deposi-
tory Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C.).
104 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, supra note 102, at 168–69.
105 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 847–48 (1996) (citing U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/GGD-89-47, SOLUTIONS TO THE THRIFT INDUSTRY PROBLEM 52,
http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/147361.pdf; LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUB-
LIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION 157 (1991)).
106 Id. at 843.
107 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, supra note 102, at 169.
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While the S&L rescue was widely called a “bailout,”108 it was not a pure
case.  As the economist Lawrence White has argued, the funds appropriated
by Congress were used to pay depositors on the basis of their legal entitle-
ment to government-supplied deposit insurance.109  What was distinctive
about the S&L rescue was that the existing insurance fund was not large
enough to satisfy the government’s liabilities, and so Congress was required
to appropriate additional funds in order to make good on them.  With some
minor exceptions, depositors received insurance payouts only up to the maxi-
mum ($100,000).110  Shareholders received nothing.111
Nonetheless, there was a great deal of public outrage directed at the
thrifts and their regulators, which Congress shared.112  The healthy, well-
managed thrifts that did nothing wrong were forced to pay a tax to cover
some of the costs of the insurance payouts.113  The existing regulatory bodies
were dissolved and replaced with new ones.  The outrage was probably due to
some highly publicized cases of criminal activity and political corruption, as
well as the expensive bill for the taxpayer that was the result of excessive risk-
taking.
The reason that the S&L rescue was called a “bailout” was probably due
to the ex post nature of the government intervention.  And the term is not as
inaccurate as White suggests.  From an ex ante perspective, the S&L insur-
ance fund was supposed to be self-sustaining, like any insurance fund.  The
premiums paid by S&Ls should in aggregate suffice to cover losses.  The gov-
ernment did not bail out the S&Ls so much as the insurance fund.
Although the efforts during the 1980s to save the S&L industry without
using taxpayer funds was ill-advised and poorly executed, the bailout itself—
when it came in 1989114—seems to have been properly structured.  The gov-
ernment was able to avoid a fire sale of assets by taking control of them and
selling them off over a long period of time.  As a result, the S&L crisis did not
metastasize into a full-blown financial crisis despite the thrift industry’s huge
share of the mortgage market.  Moreover, the bailout was necessary to ensure
that people believed the government’s deposit guarantee—without which
S&Ls, and possibly banks, would be subject to runs and panics.  To address
moral hazard, Congress passed legislation to strengthen supervision of
108 E.g., Oswald Johnston, Seidman Puts S&L Bailout at $500 Billion, L.A. TIMES (July 31,
1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-31/news/mn-1196_1_l-william-seidman.
109 WHITE, supra note 105, at 160–64.
110 Id. at 162.
111 Id.
112 Bill to Add Thrift Bailout Funds Dies, 46 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 179, 180–81 (1991); Viv-
ian Marino, Public Reaction to S&L Bailout Ranges from Anger to Apathy with AM-S&SL BJT,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 10, 1989), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Public-Reaction-
to-S-L-Bailout-Ranges-From-Anger-To-Apathy-With-AM-S-Ls-Bjt/id-884994eee3313a8af8fb7
ab82804f1e9.
113 WHITE, supra note 105, at 162–63.
114 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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S&Ls.115  The rescue was fair and nondiscriminatory since it simply ensured
that people with legal entitlements to insurance payouts received them.
Shareholders and large creditors did not receive payoffs beyond what they
were entitled to.
The 1989 bailout can also be contrasted with the implicit (failed) bailout
through regulatory forbearance.  Because the earlier bailout took the form of
secret bargains between regulators, S&Ls, and banks, it was not debated pub-
licly.  By contrast, the government used regular and public procedures to
liquidate the assets of failed S&Ls after 1989.
The most important lesson of the S&L bailout came from this earlier
botched effort by regulators to rescue banks by promising solvent banks and
S&Ls that it would allow them to reduce capital below regulatory require-
ments if they purchased insolvent S&Ls.  Congress later reversed this policy,
and banks sued, arguing that the government had breached a contract.116
Arguably, the regulators would not have resorted to such a desperate and ill-
considered measure if they had had access to sufficient bailout funds.  One
benefit of a formal statute or policy that approves of and regulates bailouts is
that it may weaken the stigma against bailouts, and in this way permit regula-
tors to bail out firms when appropriate to do so.
Another questionable feature of the (final) bailout was the determina-
tion to tax healthy thrifts in order to (partially) fund the losses from the
deposit fund.117  The tax was politically popular because it reduced the cost
to taxpayers by throwing part of the burden on shareholders of the healthy
thrifts.  But the healthy thrifts had done nothing wrong.  From an ex ante
perspective, the tax informed firms that they will be penalized if they belong
to an industry that is bailed out whether or not those specific firms acted
prudently or imprudently.  The effect is to enhance rather than reduce
moral hazard.  This is a reminder that temporary political passions—which
often take the form of wanting to punish a whole industry rather than spe-
cific bad actors—can result in bad policy.
D. 9/11 Airline Bailout
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress authorized
around $15 billion in emergency government funding for the airlines.
Under the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA),
airlines were given $5 billion as a direct payment.118  This was framed as com-
pensation for the reduction in air travel caused by the grounding of flights
after the attacks and the subsequent reduction in air traffic.  ATSSSA also
115 Id.
116 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 858 (1996).
117 Bert Ely, Savings and Loan Crisis, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY, http://
www.econlib.org/library/Enc/SavingsandLoanCrisis.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2015)
(“[H]ealthy S&Ls as well as commercial banks have been taxed approximately another $30
billion to pay for S&L cleanup costs.”).
118 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
§ 101(a)(2), 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)).
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authorized the Air Transportation Safety Board (ATSB) to issue up to $10
billion in further loans or loan guarantees to protect failing air carriers.119
The ATSB used that authority to issue loan guarantees to some—but not
all—carriers who applied for them after the attacks.120  Guarantees were pro-
vided to America West, American Trans Air, Aloha Airlines, Evergreen Inter-
national Airlines, Frontier Airlines, US Airways, and World Airways for a total
value of $1.56 billion.121  Similar to the structure in the Chrysler bailout, in
exchange for those loans the ATSB received warrants in the equity stock of
those carriers.  As a result of those warrants, the loan-guarantee arm of the
airline bailout has been profitable for the government.122
Congress did not provide a clear explanation for the airline bailouts.123
One possibility is that the airlines would have collapsed without a short-term
liquidity injection from the government because they owed money on their
high fixed costs and suddenly were deprived of revenue from ticket sales.
However, if this was the case, it seems likely that private creditors would have
made loans to the airlines; moreover, the direct transfer part of the bailout
would not have been justified.  Another possibility is that the bailout was a
form of humanitarian relief for airline stakeholders, akin to government sup-
port for individuals and businesses struck by a natural disaster like a hurri-
cane.  On this view, the bailout was motivated by moral and political, rather
than economic, considerations.  The government may also have worried that
even a temporary disruption in airline operations as a result of bankruptcy
might have exacerbated the general economic downturn caused by the shock
of the attack.
On the other hand, the moral hazard effects of the bailout were proba-
bly minimal because of the unpredictability of the attack.  The 9/11 attack
was not the sort of disaster that the airlines could have prevented by using
ordinary prudence.  And while one might argue that it was unfair to single
out the airlines for relief, Congress provided other forms of relief for other
119 ATSSSA contained other non-bailout components that served to regulate with
regard to future risk.  For example, the Act expanded the authority for the government to
provide for future insurance on certain routes. Id.
120 Margaret Blair chronicles the early loan guarantee decisions in The Economics of Post-
September 11 Financial Aid to Airlines. Margaret M. Blair, The Economics of Post-September 11
Financial Aid to Airlines, 36 IND. L. REV. 367, 367–70 (2003); see also Deborah Groban Olson,
Fair Exchange: Providing Citizens with Equity Managed by a Community Trust, in Return for Gov-
ernment Subsidies or Tax Breaks to Businesses, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 286–89
(2006).
121 Olson, supra note 120, at 288–89.
122 U.S. Sees Profit on Airline Loan Guarantee Program, USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2006), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/travel/news/2006-01-30-loan-profits_x.htm.
123 See Jonathan Lewinsohn, Note, Bailing Out Congress: An Assessment and Defense of the
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, 115 YALE L.J. 438, 457 (2005)
(discussing the difficulty in identifying a theory behind the bailouts and concluding, “[t]he
ultimate goal of the ATSSSA was to avoid the symbolic cataclysm of multiple carriers declar-
ing bankruptcy a short time after September 11”).
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direct victims of the 9/11 attack—so charges of political favoritism were
muted.
The loan-guarantee component of the bailout raises some additional
issues.  The government offered these guarantees to struggling airlines that
met certain criteria.  Firms applying for the guarantee may have failed for
reasons unrelated to 9/11.  Where a mismanaged firm could not be distin-
guished from a firm that failed because of 9/11, the loan guarantee would
reward mismanagement the same as any other bailout.  This is mitigated a bit
by the haircuts and oversight that accompanied the loan guarantees.
E. 2008–2009 Financial Crisis Bailouts
The financial crisis of 2008 resulted in a large number of bailouts of
institutions.  We cannot describe all of them in the space we have, and so will
limit ourselves to a few of the most important.
The immediate cause of the financial crisis was the collapse of housing
prices, but the severity of the crisis was due to financial innovations that had
concentrated risk in major financial institutions.124  Most financial institu-
tions were exposed in various ways to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
and related securities whose value was a function of underlying mortgages on
houses and other secured loans.  Some institutions held these securities on
their books; many institutions also used them as collateral for short-term
loans in the repo market; still others guaranteed them.  Although sophisti-
cated investors understood that housing prices could not rise forever, they
did not understand that the models used to predict the value of the CDOs
were based on excessively optimistic assumptions about housing prices, with
the result that people could not calculate the value of the CDOs when mort-
gages began to default at a rate that no one anticipated.
Other factors played a role as well.  Investors had sought safe, high-yield-
ing investments and CDOs offered higher rates than similarly rated securi-
ties.  Ratings agencies gave CDOs high ratings because they, too, did not
understand the assumptions underlying them.  The demand for CDOs drove
mortgage originators to lower underwriting standards so that they could sell
more mortgages, and mortgage packagers to accept these high-risk mort-
gages.  Meanwhile, investment banks and other financial institutions took on
ever more leverage.
The financial crisis was a classic downward spiral.  As mortgage defaults
increased, and people realized that many CDOs would default, lenders
refused to accept them as collateral except at a steep discount.  Financial
firms that borrowed in the repo market could continue to borrow only by
posting higher levels of collateral or finding more liquid collateral like trea-
suries.  The most highly leveraged firms ran out of collateral, and could no
longer borrow.  This meant that they had to sell their CDOs and related
assets in fire sales, which drove down their prices.  Indeed, all firms facing
124 See generally, e.g., THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 66; ALAN S. BLINDER,
AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED (2013); RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES (2010).
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liquidity shortages sought to unload their CDOs, but because everyone was
acting the same, there were no buyers.
As the most highly leveraged firms collapsed, the panic spread to safer
firms.  Even banks, which depend mostly on deposits rather than the repo
market, began to experience runs.  Lenders (including bank lenders) were
afraid of lending to a firm exposed to CDOs because they could not deter-
mine whether the CDOs would default or not, and thus whether potential
borrowers would be able to repay.  AIG, an insurance company, faced bank-
ruptcy because it had guaranteed CDOs and had invested in mortgage-
related securities.  At the height of the crisis, banks refused to lend to each
other or anyone else.  The crisis ended when the Fed, FDIC, and other gov-
ernment agencies made loans to the market.  Some of the toxic assets were
taken onto the balance sheets of these agencies, which have been able to
hold them to maturity.
During the financial crisis, in the fall of 2008 and winter of 2009, the
press reported that the government was engaging in numerous “bailouts.”  In
fact, many of the transactions that were labeled bailouts were not bailouts.
Let us distinguish several types of transactions.
1. Fannie/Freddie
The Federal National Mortgage Association (better known as Fannie
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are
hybrid public-private entities often referred to as Government Sponsored
Entities or GSEs.125
The two entities, chartered by acts of Congress but privately owned,126
provide support to the secondary market for mortgages.  They purchase
mortgages from lenders, put them into pools, and sell securities backed by
those pools.  The securities entitle the holders to a cash flow based on the
principal and interest payments due on the underlying mortgages.  Fannie
and Freddie then guarantee those cash flows, providing insurance against
defaults.  In exchange, they charge a guarantee fee.  Separately, Fannie and
Freddie held large investment portfolios including mortgages and mortgage-
based assets.  The result of these activities was to provide liquidity to the
mortgage market and, thus, at least in theory, fulfill their missions of provid-
ing stability and promoting access to mortgage markets.
When the housing market collapsed in 2007 and 2008, Fannie and Fred-
die began to experience record-setting losses.  As mortgage defaults
mounted, the entities were hit by escalating obligations on the guarantees.
125 See, e.g., Dwight Jaffee & John M. Quigley, The Future of the Government Sponsored
Enterprises: The Role for Government in the U.S. Mortgage Market (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 17685, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17685.pdf.
126 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 536
(codified at scattered titles of U.S.C.); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 § 731, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 429 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1451–56 (2012)).
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By the summer of 2008, each entity had lost billions of dollars.  Default by
Fannie and Freddie became a real possibility.
Such a default was likely to create a feedback loop that accelerated
losses.  The default of Fannie and Freddie would directly reduce the liquidity
in the mortgage market and signal that further liquidity support was unlikely.
Banks would then originate fewer mortgages, resulting in fewer home sales
and a further decline in housing prices, and further defaults on mortgages
guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie.
This had systemic implications.  Because Fannie and Freddie had such
massive holdings in the secondary mortgage market, many commentators
believed that their failure would significantly deepen the housing market col-
lapse.  As events would turn out to reveal, creditors and counterparties were
massively exposed to mortgage derivatives, and thus, if Fannie and Freddie
failed, would suffer enormous losses that would reduce liquidity outside of
the mortgage market.127
At the same time, there was an open question about whether the govern-
ment had guaranteed the debt of Fannie and Freddie in the first place.
Although no explicit guarantee had been made, market participants gener-
ally operated under the assumption that the government would back Fannie
and Freddie if they defaulted and the debt traded at a discount that reflected
at least some level of guarantee.128  For our analysis, this fact places the case
somewhere between ex ante insurance and a true bailout.  On the one hand,
an explicit guarantee is no different from ex ante insurance.  But this guaran-
tee was uncertain.  The legal basis for enforcing it was weak at best.129  It is
probably more accurate to characterize the status quo as an expectation that
a bailout would be provided rather than as an actual legal entitlement.
And—even if an entitlement to the implicit guarantee existed—its contours
and the mechanism for implementing it were unstated and subject to
discretion.
Given the implicit promise, many worried that a default by Fannie and
Freddie would send a major negative signal about government creditworthi-
ness (or, more specifically, its willingness to selectively default) on its general
obligations.  This ended up being a major reason given by the government
for launching a bailout.130
127 See Recent Developments in U.S. Financial Markets and Regulatory Responses to Them: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 42 (2008) (writ-
ten testimony of Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson) (“[D]ebt and other
securities issued by the GSEs are held by financial institutions around the world.  Contin-
ued confidence in the GSEs is important to maintaining financial system and market
stability.”).
128 As many analysts have noted, this allowed Fannie and Freddie to raise capital at a
much lower rate than other private participants in the market.
129 All relevant legal materials explicitly disclaimed any legal obligation to guarantee
the debt.
130 Press Release, Henry M. Paulson, Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on
Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and
Taxpayers (Sep. 9, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
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The overall transaction occurred in several steps.  The first step was
intended to be a preventative move to avoid the need for further bailouts.  In
June of 2008, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008 (HERA), which gave Treasury the power to make investments to shore
up Fannie and Freddie.131  It also created the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA) and gave it the power to place Fannie and Freddie into con-
servatorships or receiverships.132
Just a few months later, the FHFA—working with Treasury and the
Fed—exercised its power to place the entities into conservatorship and Trea-
sury used its new investment power to inject massive capital in the form of
preferred equity.  The documents governing the bailout evolved through
amendment as the crisis unfolded, but ultimately Treasury made a commit-
ment to provide unlimited funds to guarantee liabilities through 2012.133
The plan also included repayment terms and a requirement to shrink the
investment portfolios of the entities.  As part of the repayment, Fannie and
Freddie had to pay a quarterly dividend at a 10% annual rate on the amount
hp1129.aspx (“These Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements were made necessary by the
ambiguities in the GSE Congressional charters, which have been perceived to indicate gov-
ernment support for agency debt and guaranteed MBS.  Our nation has tolerated these
ambiguities for too long, and as a result GSE debt and MBS are held by central banks and
investors throughout the United States and around the world who believe them to be virtu-
ally risk-free.  Because the U.S. Government created these ambiguities, we have a responsi-
bility to both avert and ultimately address the systemic risk now posed by the scale and
breadth of the holdings of GSE debt and MBS.”); Press Release, Henry M. Paulson,
Remarks by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Financial Rescue Package and Economic
Update (Nov. 12, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
hp1265.aspx. (“Eight weeks ago, Treasury took responsibility for supporting the agency
debt securities and the agency MBS through a preferred stock purchase agreement that
guarantees a positive net worth in each enterprise—effectively, a guarantee on GSE debt
and agency MBS.  We also established a credit facility to provide the GSEs the strongest
possible liquidity backstop.  As the enterprises go through this difficult housing correction
we will, as needed and promised, purchase preferred shares under the terms of that agree-
ment.  The U.S. government honors its commitments, and investors can bank on it.”).
131 Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (codified at scattered titles of U.S.C.); see also W.
Scott Frame, The 2008 Federal Intervention to Stabilize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1458662.
132 Before HERA, Fannie and Freddie were regulated by the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which had been created in 1992.  The OFHEO had statu-
tory authority to place Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship.  But the details of that
power were not clear.  HERA added the power of receivership and set out the substantive
and procedural grounds (including judicial review) for implementing either the conserva-
torship or the receivership options.
133 Second Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury and Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (Dec. 24, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/000095012309073866/f71241exv10
w1.htm; Second Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury and Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n (Dec. 24, 2009), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310522/000095012309074293/w76743exv4w1.htm.
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that Treasury had invested.  In August of 2012, the terms were amended
again to replace the dividend payment with a “net-income sweep.”  This
meant that instead of paying Treasury a 10% dividend on its investment, each
firm pays a dividend equal to that firm’s positive net worth (defined as total
assets less total liabilities).134  The effect is that all net income gets paid to
Treasury every quarter.  That essentially wiped out the remaining interest of
all equity holders.135
The various stages represent some of the different types of bailouts and
bailout-like actions that the government can use to address the financial diffi-
culties of systemically important institutions.
The law as it stood before HERA provided vague conservatorship author-
ity that might be viewed as a grant of bailout authority.136  While the govern-
ment denied that it would bail out Fannie or Freddie, the market seems to
have assumed either that the law provided bailout authority or that Congress
would act if necessary.
By contrast, HERA was an ex post bailout statute.  Once the crisis was
imminent, Congress took ex post actions to limit the impact of the crisis.  To
be sure, HERA did not implement a bailout; rather it authorized the govern-
ment to implement a bailout.  The statute signaled that the government was
standing behind the debt of Fannie and Freddie.137  In this way, the Congres-
134 For the first year, the dividend calculation allows the firms to retain a cushion of $3
billion in value.  For example, if at the end of a quarter Fannie’s net worth (assets minus
liabilities) was $10 billion it would pay a dividend of $7 billion.  The $3 billion cushion of
value is to be reduced by $600 million each year until it reaches zero.  Third Amendment
to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Trea-
sury and Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1026214/000119312512359938/d398152dex101.htm; Third Amendment to
Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Trea-
sury and Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/310522/000119312512359930/d399489dex41.htm.
135 The amendment also accelerated the reduction in the firms’ investment portfolios.
136 The exact contours of that authority are at the heart of the disputed claims in the
current litigation.  The district court in one of the cases said this much: “Since 1992, when
Congress established FHFA’s predecessor, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Over-
sight (‘OFHEO’), the GSEs have been subject to regulatory oversight, including the spec-
ter of conservatorship or receivership under which the regulatory agency succeeds to ‘all
rights’ of the GSEs and shareholders. . . . This enduring regulatory scheme governing the
GSEs at the time the class plaintiffs purchased their shares represents the ‘background
principle’ that inheres in the stock certificates.”  Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d
208, 240–41 (D.D.C. 2014).  This will no doubt be litigated further as the cases are
appealed.
137 Public statements made by Treasury in association with the passing of HERA suggest
that the belief that the mere existence of the power to shore up Fannie and Freddie would
be enough to stop the bleeding and that the power would not need to be used.  As Paulson
characterized the move: “If you have got a bazooka and people know you have got it, you
may not have to take it out.” Recent Developments in U.S. Financial Markets and Regulatory
Responses to Them: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th
Cong. 19 (2008) (testimony of Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson).
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sional authorization can be viewed as correcting for Congress’s ex ante fail-
ure to create sufficient bailout authority.
The crucial aspects of the bailout were the injection of capital through
preferred equity that had repayment priority junior to all debt but senior to
equity and the imposition of federal control through the FHFA appointed
conservator.138  These were pure ex post bailout measures taken by the exec-
utive branch.
The net-income sweep of 2012 can be viewed in several different lights.
On one account, it was just one part of a larger orderly resolution plan to
wind down the firms.139  On another, it might be viewed as an ex post mea-
sure to impose a haircut so as to minimize moral hazard.  Or, in the view of
unhappy shareholders, it was a politically motivated transfer of wealth from
equity to the government.140
With regard to ex post efficiency, Fannie and Freddie have recovered
and the government made money on the rescue.  The magnitude of the
profit for the government is difficult to calculate because of changes in
accounting rules and because of the complicated effects of tax credits, which
both facilitated repayment of the loan and reduced tax revenues.  Profit mea-
sures aside, the bailout prevented a more significant collapse of the real
estate market and so it is difficult to argue that it was inefficient.  That is, of
course, not to say that no other better bailout options existed.
The moral hazard complaints are once again salient.  By rescuing Fred-
die and Fannie’s creditors, the government confirmed that investors who dis-
believed the government’s no-bailout vow were correct.  Critics feared that
the bailout thus set the stage for endless recurrence of the too-big-to-fail phe-
nomenon—that creditors will overinvest in large firms whose collapse would
cause a systemic crisis because they expect that those firms will be bailed
out.141  However, it is possible that this message was muted by the specific
purposes of housing legislation—to subsidize mortgages—which may not be
generalizable to other settings.
138 N. ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42760, FANNIE MAE’S AND FREDDIE MAC’S
FINANCIAL STATUS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5–6, 10–11 (Aug. 13, 2013), https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42760.pdf.
139 The creditors of Fannie and Freddie worried that the firms could suffer future dis-
tress under the pressure of the 10% dividend obligations to Treasury.  Nick Timiraos, Fan-
nie, Freddie Stuck in a Dividends Circle, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052748704615504576172420039570798.  Both Fannie and Freddie
had repeatedly increased their obligations to Treasury by borrowing funds to keep current
on the dividend obligation.  Badawi & Casey, supra note 15, at 451–53.  The actions of 2012
addressed this by eliminating that obligation and putting in place a resolution plan that
would protect creditors while the firms were wound down. Id. at 469.
140 See, e.g., Complaint, Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, No.13-465 C (Fed. Cl.
July 9, 2013); Complaint, Wash. Fed. v. United States, No. 13-385 C (Fed. Cl. June 10,
2013); Complaint, Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, No. 13-1025 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2013); Com-
plaint, Cacciapelle v. Fed. Nat’l Mort. Ass’n, No. 13-1149 (D.D.C. July 29, 2013).
141 See William Poole, Moral Hazard: The Long-Lasting Legacy of Bailouts, 65 FIN. ANALYSTS
J. 17 (2009).
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Unfairness concerns and potential for political abuse are the subjects of
current litigation over the net-income sweep.142  Plaintiffs claim that the gov-
ernment took value from equity in violation of their legal rights because cred-
itors were fully compensated.143  Other critics of the bailouts argued that the
government should have provided support to homeowners rather than to
financial institutions.144
From the standpoint of process, one can argue that the bailouts were
procedurally fair because they were publicly debated in Congress.  On the
other hand, litigants challenging the bailout allege that “[t]he Government’s
conservatorship plan was hatched in secrecy and gave the Companies no
choice but to accept Government control.”145  They argue that public state-
ments surrounding the passage of HERA suggested that the entities were
financially sound.146  And then the government sprung the bailout package
on the companies.  The CEO of Fannie stated, “[W]e were given 24 hours to
accede to a government takeover—or else the government would effectively
go to war against the company.”147  These claims are subject to litigation.148
The litigation itself serves process values by forcing the government to pro-
vide a public defense of its bailout choices.
2. Banks, Investment Banks, and Related Institutions
FDIC insurance.  Most commercial banks pay for deposit insurance from
the FDIC.  When banks fail, the FDIC compensates depositors.  This type of
compensation is not a “bailout” because the banks and depositors pay for an
ex ante insurance scheme and the banks submit to regulation.149  However,
the FDIC also possesses statutory authority to cover depositors above the
insurance limit (which was then $100,000) in emergencies.150  The FDIC
used that authority to raise the limit to $250,000 for existing deposits, and to
guarantee certain other forms of bank debt.151  Because this intervention was
142 See, e.g., Complaint, Fairholme Funds, supra note 140; Complaint, Wash. Fed., supra
note 140; Complaint, Perry Capital, supra note 140; Complaint, Cacciapelle, supra note 140.
143 E.g., Complaint, Fairholme Funds, supra note 140, at 2–6; Complaint, Wash. Fed.,
supra note 140, at 19–20; Complaint, Perry Capital, supra note 140, at 6; Complaint, Cac-
ciapelle, supra note 140, at 3–4.
144 E.g., ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT (2014).
145 Complaint, Wash. Fed., supra note 140, at 23.
146 Id. at 23–24.
147 Id. at 24.
148 E.g., Complaint, Fairholme Funds, supra note 140, at 2–6; Complaint, Wash. Fed.,
supra note 140, at 19–20; Complaint, Perry Capital, supra note 140, at 6; Complaint, Cac-
ciapelle, supra note 140, at 3–4.
149 See Pennacchi, supra note 42, at 340–41.
150 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, § 141(G), 105 Stat. 2236, 2275 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2012)).
151 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-100, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
ACT: REGULATORS’ USE OF SYSTEMIC RISK EXCEPTION RAISES MORAL HAZARD CONCERNS AND
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO CLARIFY THE PROVISION (2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10100.pdf.
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ex post, saved many banks from runs, and prevented many bank creditors
from defaults, it fits our definition of a bailout.  It was an agency-led bailout
rather than a congressional bailout because the FDIC relied on existing statu-
tory authority.
Discount lending to commercial banks.  The Fed has statutory authority to
make loans to commercial banks.152  During the financial crisis, the Fed
made loans through its discount window and (as described below) through
broad-based facilities.  Fed discount-window lending is in principle routine: it
is always open to banks that experience temporary liquidity difficulties.  But,
in the context of the crisis, discount-window lending also resembled bailout
lending.  Like the FDIC, the Fed lent widely to banks experiencing liquidity
difficulties, and in this way rescued banks and their creditors.  The loans were
also ex post; like the FDIC emergency loans that exceeded the $100,000 limit,
banks did not pay for them in the form of ex ante premiums.  Discount-
window lending was supplemented with advances from Federal Home Loan
Banks, which was also a form of ex post lending.153
Fed broad-based facilities.  The Fed also established numerous broad-based
credit facilities through which it lent money to classes of borrowers that satis-
fied certain eligibility criteria.  Some of these facilities supplied credit to com-
mercial banks by advancing loans against CDOs.154  Others relied on the
Fed’s emergency power to make loans to non-banks under section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act.  The Primary Credit Dealer Facility advanced over-
night credit to primary dealers (mostly, the major investment banks) against
various types of collateral, including CDOs.  Other facilities, notably the
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, enabled the Fed to advance
funds for longer periods of time against toxic assets.155  Still other facilities
provided credit to money market funds and non-financial institutions that
relied on the commercial paper market.156  Virtually all of these facilities
provide bailouts in the sense that the money was supplied ex post to firms
that faced financial difficulties and had not paid premiums that entitled
them to loans.157
152 Federal Reserve Act, §§ 10B, 13(3), 12 U.S.C. §§ 347b, 343.
153 ADAM B. ASHCRAFT ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN
BANK SYSTEM: THE LENDER OF NEXT-TO-LAST RESORT? (Nov. 2008), http://
www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr357.pdf.
154 Efraim Benmelech, An Empirical Analysis of the Fed’s Term Auction Facility 6–7 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18304, 2012), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w18304.
155 James Felkerson, $29,000,000,000,000: A Detailed Look at the Fed’s Bailout by Funding
Facility and Recipient 25–28 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 698, 2011) http://
www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_698.pdf.
156 Id. at 21–25.
157 The Fed also provided bailout loans to Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley by con-
verting them into Bank Holding Companies, which gave them access to the discount win-
dow like regular banks.
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The Bear Stearns transaction.  In March 2008, creditors cut off credit to
Bear Stearns, a major investment bank.  The Fed rescued Bear by arranging
for its sale to JP Morgan.  Because JP Morgan did not want to own Bear’s
toxic assets, the Fed set up an entity called Maiden Lane, which bought those
assets, financed by a $1.15 billion loan from JP Morgan and a $28.82 billion
loan from the Fed.  Bear Stearns shareholders were paid $2 per share, later
increased to $10.158  The Fed relied on its section 13(3) powers.  The rescue
was a bailout because it was ex post, and it ensured that Bear’s creditors were
paid in full.  Indeed, even Bear’s shareholders received some value.
The AIG transaction.  In September of 2008, creditors stopped lending to
AIG, a large insurance company.  Creditors lost confidence in AIG because it
had issued credit default swaps (CDS) on CDOs, and had speculated in mort-
gage-based securities in its securities lending program.  Under the terms of
its contracts with counterparties, AIG was required to post collateral as the
ratings of the CDOs declined; this in turn depleted AIG’s liquidity, which
caused ratings agencies to downgrade AIG.  The downgrades then required
AIG to post more collateral, resulting in a downward spiral.  The Fed issued a
series of large loans to rescue AIG.159  It financed Maiden Lane II, which
purchased the mortgage-backed securities, and Maiden Lane III, which pur-
chased CDOs from AIG’s CDS counterparties.160  This rescue was a bailout
because it was a discretionary ex post loan, and it ensured that AIG’s credi-
tors were paid in full.  AIG’s shareholders also retained some value in their
shares.
Equity injections into banks.  On October 3, 2008, President Obama signed
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which created the Troubled
Assets Relief Plan (TARP).161  This program made available $700 billion to
purchase toxic assets or invest in financial institutions.  More than $200 bil-
lion of this money was committed to the Capital Purchase Program, through
which Treasury bought preferred stock or senior debt from banks, including
large loan guarantees for Citibank and Bank of America.162  Unlike earlier
bailouts, the funds for these bailouts were appropriated by Congress rather
than lent by the Fed or another agency.  Thus, Congress itself acted ex post
to rescue the banks, and in doing so ensured that their creditors were
protected.
158 THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 66, at 290.
159 Some of the later loans were financed from TARP, and thus was money from Trea-
sury that had been appropriated by Congress in EESA. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, June
Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit
Strategy 70 (2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-
111JPRT56698.pdf.
160 Id. at 68–79.
161 Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211–41 (2012)).
162 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-458, CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM: STATUS
OF THE PROGRAM AND FINANCIAL HEALTH OF REMAINING PARTICIPANTS 3–4 (2013), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/660/654400.pdf.
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Assistance to homeowners.  The government put in place a number of pro-
grams to aid homeowners during the financial crisis, the most significant of
which was the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).163  Trea-
sury committed $75 billion of TARP funds to provide incentives (typically a
few hundred or thousand dollars per loan) to loan servicers to renegotiate
mortgages with homeowners who could not make payments, as well as to the
investors who own the mortgages, and to the homeowners themselves if they
made payments under the renegotiated mortgages.164  Under the terms of
the program, the loan servicer reduces mortgage payments, plus taxes and
insurance, to 31% of the homeowner’s income by cutting the interest rate,
extending the period of the loan, and/or shifting payments to the conclu-
sion of the loan in the form of a balloon payment.165  So far, about one
million homeowners have benefited from HAMP loans.166  Although HAMP
was not described as a bailout in public debates, it fits the definition of a
bailout, albeit only a partial bailout.  HAMP indirectly (and partially) bailed
out qualified homeowners by reducing their liability and extending the loan
term so that they do not default because of liquidity problems.
Treasury showed little enthusiasm for bailing out homeowners; it was
prodded to do so by Congress.167  The reason appears to be that Treasury
believed that bailing out financial institutions was a simpler and more direct
way of addressing the financial crisis.168  Once credit was flowing again, lend-
ers and homeowners would voluntarily renegotiate their loans.  Thus, the
government would directly bail out banks but homeowners would receive
indirect bailouts.  Whether or not Treasury was correct, this approach was
politically controversial.  The public viewed banks as wrongdoers (even
though many banks had done nothing wrong) and homeowners as victims
(even though many homeowners had deliberately agreed to risky and expen-
sive mortgages).  Under HAMP, the government provided direct (partial)
bailouts to both creditors and homeowners.
163 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a).
164 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF FORECLO-
SURE MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER SIX MONTHS 38–42 (2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/CPRT-111JPRT52671/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT52671.pdf.
165 Id.
166 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
REPORT THROUGH THE SECOND QUARTER OF 2014, at 6 (2014), http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/
2Q14%20Quarterly%20MHA%20Report%20Final.pdf.
167 Sarah Binder, Geithner’s Unicorn: Could Congress Have Done More to Relieve the Mortgage
Crisis?, WASH. POST: THE MONKEY CAGE (May 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/19/geithners-unicorn-could-congress-have-done-more-
to-relieve-the-mortgage-crisis/; Paul Kiel & Olga Pierce, Dems: Obama Broke Pledge to Force
Banks to Help Homeowners, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/
dems-obama-broke-pledge-to-force-banks-to-help-homeowners.
168 Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, Why Tim Geithner is Wrong on Homeowner Debt Relief, WASH.
POST: WONKBLOG (May 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2014/05/14/why-tim-geithner-is-wrong-on-homeowner-debt-relief/.
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3. Automobile Companies
In the fall of 2008, the big-three American automakers—Ford, GM, and
Chrysler—were in trouble.  A long-term decline in their market share had
been compounded by a dramatic reduction in the overall demand for
cars.169  The firms needed to be restructured or possibly liquidated.  But
while Ford had taken on financing prior to the financial crisis, GM and
Chrysler had no realistic means of raising capital in the market once the
crisis began.  In order to avoid an abrupt collapse of the firms, the govern-
ment provided a bailout.  The arguments in favor of a bailout painted a
doomsday scenario where the failure of any one of the three automakers
would cause the collapse of their vast network of connected suppliers thus
endangering the operations of the other two.170  In its extreme version, this
scenario would put over three million jobs at risk at a time when the econ-
omy was already struggling.171
The government’s initial response in late 2008 was a stopgap mea-
sure.172  GM, Chrysler, and their financing arms received over $24.8 billion
in TARP funds.173  The more systematic bailout came in 2009 in the struc-
tured reorganization of the firms through the formal process of the federal
Bankruptcy Code with tens of billions of dollars of financing provided by the
U.S. and Canadian Governments.174  The total investment by the U.S. Trea-
sury approximated $80 billion.175
The auto payments are plain bailouts.  The government injected capital
to prop up insolvent firms where no legal entitlement existed.  The debate
over whether they were “good” bailouts has focused on the themes that are
now familiar.  First, critics claim that the bailouts were unnecessary support
for two failed companies that did not present real systemic risk.176  Under
169 Austan D. Goolsbee & Alan B. Krueger, A Retrospective Look at Rescuing and Restructur-
ing Chrysler and General Motors, 29 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming).
170 Id.; Sean McAlinden et al., CAR Research Memorandum: The Impact on the U.S. Economy
of a Major Contraction of the Detroit Three Automakers, CTR. FOR AUTO. RESEARCH (CAR) (Nov.
2008), http://www.cargroup.org/?module=publications&event=View&pubID=24; Robert
E. Scott, ECON. POLICY INST., When Giants Fall (2008), http://s4.epi.org/files/page/-/pdf/
bp227.pdf.
171 Goolsbee & Krueger, supra note 169; McAlinden et al., supra note 170, at 4; Scott,
supra note 170, at 4.
172 CANIS & WEBEL, supra note 66, at 5–6.
173 Id.
174 See Douglas G. Baird, Lessons from the Automobile Reorganizations, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
271, 271–72 (2012); Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and
the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, U. ILL. L. REV. 1375 (2010) (providing the detailed
government investment structure in the auto bailouts); Roe & Skeel, supra note 15, at
733–34.
175 Auto Industry: Program Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Jan. 8, 2015, 4:46 PM),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/automotive-pro-
grams/Pages/default.aspx.
176 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Deadly Sins of the Chrysler Bankruptcy, FORBES (May
12, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/11/chrysler-bankruptcy-mortgage-opinions-
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this view the government bailed out insolvent firms with no strong rationale.
Like the other bailouts, the bite of this critique is once again softened by
subsequent events.177  The auto industry has experienced a major recovery
and Treasury has recovered a sizeable portion of its investment.178  To say
that the government was not fully compensated addresses profitability but
does not answer the efficiency question.  Returns to other stakeholders may
have offset any loss the government took on the transaction.  Even conserva-
tive estimates suggest that if viewed merely as a jobs program, the bailout was
inexpensive.179
Critics also argued that the bailouts created moral hazard.180  Ford
planned and obtained market financing for its restructuring earlier and did
not ask for bailouts.181  Chrysler and GM did not.  And so, strong arguments
can be made that GM and Chrysler failed not because of the financial crisis,
but because they had been mismanaged.  The rescue might then discourage
managers in the future from making painful adjustments to financing or
operations.
The government tried to address this problem by wiping out equity and
imposing steep haircuts on senior creditors (who may also have been in a
position to force the firms to restructure themselves).  But it also protected
employees by ensuring that the union pensions received valuable equity in
the reorganized firms and significant compensation for many of their claims.
columnists-epstein.html (“[L]ong ago Chrysler and GM should have been allowed to bleed
to death under ordinary bankruptcy rules, without government subsidy or penalty.”); John
Tamny, Memo to Washington: Let GM Fail, FORBES (July 10, 2008), http://www.forbes.com/
2008/07/09/gm-washington-detroit-oped-cx_jt_0710tamny.html (arguing that “GM’s vital-
ity is increasingly irrelevant when it comes to the health and size of the U.S. economy”);
Todd Zywicki, The Auto Bailout and the Rule of Law, NAT’L AFF., Spring 2011, at 66, http://
www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-auto-bailout-and-the-rule-of-law.
177 We do not mean to suggest that just because a firm recovers that the decision to bail
it out was efficient at the time the decision was made.  We recognize the risk of hindsight
bias.  But the subsequent success of the company is relevant evidence and is often invoked
in response to efficiency critics.
178 According to their webpage they have recovered $69.2 billion of the $80 billion
invested. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 175.
179 Goolsbee & Krueger, supra note 169 (estimating the cost of the bailout at $14,000
per job, based on a conservative estimate of 800,000 jobs saved).
180 Lasting Implications of the General Motors Bailout: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Regulatory Affairs, Stimulus Oversight and Gov’t Spending of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 112th Cong. 100–01 (2011) (written testimony of Shikha Dalmia, Reason Founda-
tion Senior Analyst); Poole, supra note 141, at 23.
181 Lasting Implications of the General Motors Bailout: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Regulatory Affairs, Stimulus Oversight and Gov’t Spending of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 112th Cong. (2011) (written testimony of Shikha Dalmia, Reason Foundation
Senior Analyst) (“[T]he bailout rewarded GM’s irresponsible, reckless behavior and penal-
ized Ford’s prudent, forward-looking one.  Given such precedent, any company that feels
that it is too big to fail, or is a national icon, or is deeply enmeshed in the broader U.S.
economy, or is a major regional employer, will wonder whether it makes more sense for it
to save for an economic downturn or hold out for taxpayer assistance.”); Goolsbee & Krue-
ger, supra note 169.
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The union employees, through the Voluntary Employment Beneficiary Asso-
ciation (VEBA), were well compensated for the claims.  The VEBA received a
large stake (in the form of 17.5% of common stock and additional preferred
stock and warrants) in the new reorganized GM and had a large chunk of its
claims assumed by the new entity.182  For Chrysler, the outcome was similar.
Chrysler was sold to an entity controlled by Fiat and financed by the United
States.  Chrysler’s private secured creditors received cash amounting to about
twenty-nine cents on the dollar.  Many general unsecured creditors received
little or nothing while the Chrysler VEBA had many of its claims assumed by
the new entity and received a 55% equity stake in the new firm.183
This decision raised howls.  During the years leading up to the bailouts,
one of the main competitive disadvantages for the big-three automakers was
their labor costs.  Compared with the production of transplant firms—for-
eign firms with production operations in the United States—the American
labor costs were 45% higher.184  The incentives for the unions to bargain
with other stakeholders to avoid failure are dramatically reduced when they
are immune to the costs of the failure.  Unions have no incentive to avoid
deals that put the firm in a precarious position.185
Critics of the bailouts also complained about their fairness.  They argued
that GM and Chrysler were chosen for bailouts because of political motiva-
tions rather than any assessment that bailing them out was socially opti-
mal.186  Even supporters of the bailout suggest that the necessity of the
182 Goolsbee & Krueger, supra note 169.
183 Under the terms of the plan, the VEBA stake was reduced to 41.5% after Fiat met
specified performance milestones. Chrysler Group LLC Completes Final Performance Event; Fiat
S.p.A. Ownership Rises to 58.5 Percent; Fuel-Efficient Dodge Dart to be Revealed at NAIAS on Jan. 9,
PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/chrysler-group-
llc-completes-final-performance-event-fiat-spa-ownership-rises-to-585-percent-fuel-efficient-
dodge-dart-to-be-revealed-at-naias-on-jan-9-136720393.html.  Then in 2014, the remaining
VEBA equity was sold to Fiat.  The transaction was structured so that VEBA received $1.9
billion in cash from Chrysler, $1.75 billion in cash from Fiat, and a promise from Chrysler
to pay it $700 million per year for the next four years. Fiat Reaches Deal with UAW Trust to
Buy Rest of Chrysler, REUTERS (Jan. 1, 2014), http://mobile.reuters.com/article/
idUSBREA000FK20140101?irpc=932.
184 That included 25% in higher hourly compensation and additional costs from legacy
retiree benefits.
185 Trade creditors also received favorable treatment in the bankruptcies.  This has
been less controversial—likely for two reasons.  First, the practice of assuming trade credit
is one we often see in reorganizations that do not involve bailouts or government involve-
ment.  Second, the trade creditors are assumed by most to have less political influence on
the bailout process.
186 See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, Economic Uncertainty, the Courts, and the Rule of Law, 35 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 200–02 (2012); Richard A. Epstein, The Libertarian’s Dilemma, HOO-
VER INSTITUTION (Nov. 4, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/research/libertarians-dilemma
(“The auto bailout snatched Chrysler out of the hands of its creditors in order to dump it
into the hands of the president’s close union confederates—who, not coincidentally, are
the largest contributors of dollars and services to his campaign.”); Paul Roderick Gregory,
Obama Didn’t Save Union Jobs, He Saved Union Pay, FORBES (June 21, 2011), http://
www.forbes.com/2011/06/21/bailout-autoworkers-unions.html?feed=rss_home (describ-
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bailout was questionable at the time.187  These general objections fold into
general process criticisms against TARP in general.  The decisions to use
TARP funds were made by the executive branch behind closed doors without
full public vetting and the motivations for those decisions were difficult for
outside observers to assess.
Critics also argued that the government acted unfairly by protecting the
claims of union employees at the expense of senior creditors and other
unsecured creditors.188  In both the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies the com-
panies were sold in “363 sales” (the bankruptcy term for the common sale or
auction of assets)189 where the procedures essentially required any bidder to
agree to the payout structure as a condition to participating in the auction.
In a 363 sale, there are bidding procedures that dictate how the auction will
be run and who will be allowed to participate.190  For both GM and Chrysler,
those procedures specified that to participate in the auction a bidder had to
agree to assume specified liabilities and agree to grant the VEBAs the pre-
scribed equity stake.  In response to objections, the bidding procedures were
amended to allow bids from any firm that “after consultation with the Credi-
tors’ Committee, the U.S. Treasury and the UAW, [was] determined by the
Debtors in the exercise of their fiduciary duties to be a Qualified Bid.”191
This was a hollow exception.  No potential outside bidder would have access
to the full information about the assets necessary to make a firm offer to
trigger a duty to be considered.192  No bidder requested to be excused from
the procedures.
In the Chrysler case, a dissenting member of the senior lending group
objected to the sale process.193  The secured loans had been made through a
loan syndicate.  The relationship between the participating lenders, as is
common, was governed by an agreement that provided for certain decisions
ing the bailouts as a precedent that “fosters corruption and political favoritism”); Rich
Lowry, Misplaced Bailout Pride, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 3, 2011), http://
www.nationalreview.com/article/268720/misplaced-bailout-pride-rich-lowry (describing
the auto bailouts as “shot through with lawlessness and political favoritism”).
187 See Goolsbee & Krueger, supra note 169.  This is especially the case for Chrysler. See
Ryan Lizza, Inside the Crisis: Larry Summers and the White House Economic Team, THE NEW
YORKER (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/12/inside-the-
crisis (noting an internal advisor’s opposition to the Chrysler bailout).
188 See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization after Chrysler and
General Motors, 18 AMER. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 306–10 (2010); Baird, supra note 174, at
279–81; Brubaker & Taab, supra note 174, at 1391; Roe & Skeel, supra note 15, at 746–49,
758–59.
189 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012); Douglas E. Deutsch & Michael G. Distefano, The Mechanics
of a § 363 Sale, 30 AMER. BANKR. INST. J. 48 (2011).
190 Id. at 49.
191 In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 109 n.25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (alteration in origi-
nal), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom., Ind. State
Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) and vacated sub nom.
192 See Adler, supra note 188, at 309.
193 In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 109.  GM’s secured credit was held by Government
entities and so there was no creditor to bring the claim.
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to be made by a vote and for actions to be carried out by an appointed repre-
sentative of the group (the administrative agent).  An overwhelming majority
of participating lenders voted in favor of supporting the Chrysler sale.  Thus,
the loan group did not object.
The wrinkle was that the majority of participating lenders who voted in
favor of the reorganization had also received TARP funds from Treasury.
The dissenting creditors alleged that the government’s influence over these
TARP recipients discouraged the latter from raising objections to the govern-
ment’s plan.194  These objections of the dissenting creditors, however, failed
to stop the sale from being consummated.195
The best defense of these structures is that no other bidder existed and
so the bidding procedures had no real effect.196  The counterargument is a
procedural one: the entire point of having an auction is to test such claims
about the market.  Bankruptcy law places a large premium on market tests197
and procedures that exclude market participants defeat the purpose of the
test.  Because of the process followed, the critics argue, we will never know
the answers to questions about other bidders.198
A more general defense of the bankruptcy process is that the govern-
ment intervention made no one worse off.  GM and Chrysler would have col-
lapsed without government intervention and the government bought these
firms.  Like any buyer, the government was free to do what it wanted with
firms it bought.199  When the government gave the VEBA a 55% stake in
Chrysler, the action had no impact on the rights of other creditors.
That argument has some weight if the question is one of proper bank-
ruptcy procedure.  Perhaps a buyer is free to give away value to anyone it
chooses.200  Things are less clear, however, when the government intervenes
194 Id. at 103.
195 The bankruptcy court and later the Second Circuit rejected the objections.  By the
time the issue reached the Supreme Court, the sale had been consummated and the Court
determined that the issue was moot.  The Court then vacated the opinion, Ind. State Police
Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009), under a doctrine that allows it to do so
“to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal conse-
quences.”  United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 41 (1950).
196 Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 531, 532 (2009).
197 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434,
457–58, 460 (1999) (discussing desirability of a market test).
198 Roe & Skeel, supra note 15, at 746–49.
199 Baird, supra note 174, at 279–81 (exploring the merits and flaws of this argument).
200 The question is a subject of a deep debate in bankruptcy law and scholarship. See In
re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 93–101 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that gifting violates the
absolute priority rule); In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 513–15 (3d Cir.
2005) (holding that gifting violates the absolute priority rule); In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984
F.2d 1305, 1311–15 (1st Cir. 1993), reh’g denied, 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that
gifting does not violate the absolute priority rule); see generally Harvey R. Miller & Ronit J.
Berkovich, The Implications of the Third Circuit’s Armstrong Decision on Creative Corporate
Restructuring: Will Strict Construction of the Absolute Priority Rule Make Chapter 11 Consensus Less
Likely?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1345 (2006).
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in an emergency.  The government will always be the dominant and essential
creditor in a bailout (thus, the lender of last resort label).  Bailout policy is
then a question of how the government should exercise its power when it has
that leverage as a monopolist.  An optimal bailout policy will prevent the gov-
ernment from abusing its power.  Through that lens, the complaints of politi-
cal favoritism are more troubling.
These questions bleed into the fourth area of concern: process.  These
bailouts were orchestrated by the administration under the general TARP
authority, not by Congress.  There was no legislation from Congress in favor
of an auto bailout—to the contrary an initial auto bailout legislation proposal
died in the Senate on December 11, 2008.201  The bailouts were negotiated
in secret.  While approval by the bankruptcy courts was necessary, the courts
were confronted with a negotiated deal that they were reluctant to disturb in
the midst of a crisis.
Litigation after the crisis has, however, given courts an opportunity to
revisit the government’s actions.  Auto dealers, whose agreements with
Chrysler and GM were terminated in the bankruptcy, brought a lawsuit
against the government.202  These dealers claim that the government used its
leverage to force GM and Chrysler to terminate many of their dealership
agreements.  The termination of those agreements is unquestionably legal
under the bankruptcy code.203  The question is whether that termination
becomes an unconstitutional taking when the government forces the private
party to take the action.  The Federal Circuit recently held that a coerced
termination that caused damage would be a taking.204  But the court’s lan-
guage suggests that a high burden awaits plaintiffs on repleading:
Absent an allegation that GM and Chrysler would have avoided bankruptcy
but for the government’s intervention and that the franchises would have
had value in that scenario, or that such bankruptcies would have preserved
some value for the plaintiffs’ franchises, the terminations actually had no net
negative economic impact on the plaintiffs because their franchises would
have lost all value regardless of the government action.205
  This standard might block the worst forms of government abuse—for
example, where the government used its influence over stakeholders to force
the companies into bankruptcy and then structured the bankruptcy to favor
certain parties.  But it leaves open more subtle forms of abuse.  For example,
imagine that the government offered to finance a reorganization of the firms
on the condition that certain stakeholders benefit at the expense of others.
Even if the disfavored stakeholders receive a higher payout than they would
have in bankruptcy, such favoritism would be objectionable.  And, of course,
201 Randall W. Forsyth, Failure Is an Option as Senate Kills Auto Bailout, BARRON’S (Dec.
12, 2008), http://online.barrons.com/articles/SB122908223411301599?tesla=Y.
202 A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
203 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012).
204 A & D Auto Sales, 748 F.3d at 1158.
205 Id.
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the dealers’ legal theory provides courts with no authority to question the
wisdom of the decision to bail out.
F. Lessons
Many commentators believed that the bailouts rewarded risky invest-
ments and depleted the public treasury without creating any benefits.  Were
these beliefs correct?  To answer this question, we disaggregate the various
complaints.
1. Ex Post Efficient
One question raised by a bailout is whether it is necessary—whether it
advances a public goal.  The usual justification for bailouts is that they create
a macroeconomic benefit: the avoidance of the social costs associated with
unemployment and underuse of capital.  The usual complaint is that they are
mere transfers to favored groups.  Thus, a necessary (but not sufficient) con-
dition for a socially desirable bailout is a plausible pie-expanding
macroeconomic benefit, or what we have called ex post efficiency.
Let us start with financial institutions, which provide a better case for
bailouts than non-financial institutions do.  Economists divide struggling
financial institutions into two categories: solvent firms that face a liquidity
crisis and insolvent firms.  A solvent firm faces a liquidity crisis when it cannot
borrow enough money to fund its operations, and so must sell off assets at
fire-sale prices.  The returns on these sales may be low enough to drive the
firm into insolvency.  For more than a century, it has been basic doctrine,
attributed to the British commentator Walter Bagehot, that the central bank,
or other government institutions, should lend to solvent but illiquid firms.206
The additional liquidity enables the firm to survive while it sells off its assets
gradually at their true value or obtains credit from the private market.
Although there is disagreement on what the terms of such a rescue loan
should be, there is little doubt that such a loan is ex post efficient.207  The
reason is that the loan costs the government almost nothing, and it will be
fully repaid, while the loan prevents the contagion effects of the firm’s col-
lapse.  If the firm’s creditors collapse as well, then they too must sell off assets
at fire-sale prices, and they and other firms will stop lending.  The sudden
withdrawal of credit from the economy has huge macroeconomic costs.208
Businesses stop borrowing and fire employees; consumers stop buying.
The treatment of insolvent financial firms is more complicated.  Econo-
mists worry that if the government bails out insolvent firms, then creditors
206 WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 188–89
(Hartley Withers ed., E. P. Dutton & Co. 1920) (1873).
207 For a general model of the central bank as a lender of last resort, see Xavier Freixas
et al., The Lender of Last Resort: A Twenty-First Century Approach, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1085
(2004); see also Fischer, supra note 33, at 86–87.
208 See generally CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT
(2011) (covering a quantitative and historical analysis of various financial crises).
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will make excessively risky loans.  But this is a problem with ex ante incen-
tives, to be discussed below, not ex post efficiency.  From an ex post perspec-
tive, the only question for the government is whether the collapse of the firm
will result in contagion that produces macroeconomic costs.  If the answer is
yes—which usually depends on the firm being large and interconnected, or
“systemically risky”—then the government should rescue the firm, or arrange
that its creditors are paid in full (or at least adequately).
The case for bailing out non-financial firms is more difficult still.  As a
general matter, the collapse of a non-financial firm will not hurt the credit
system, just because (by definition) non-financial firms are not part of the
credit system.  If a widget-manufacturer collapses, its creditors will lose
money, but most creditors are diversified enough that their losses will not
ramify throughout the financial system; and if they do, the usual response is
to rescue the creditors, not the widget-manufacturer.  Still, some non-finan-
cial firms may be large enough that their collapse will produce significant
macroeconomic costs.  If, for example, a firm with a huge number of employ-
ees and suppliers collapses, the resulting macroeconomic shock—loss of
employment and spending—could have contagious effects.  The employees
stop spending, causing other businesses to collapse; they default on their
mortgages, causing banks to collapse; and so on.  The difficulty with these
types of bailouts is that they can be a disguised method for making transfers
to favored interests.209  That difficulty can be seen most starkly in the 2009
auto bailouts, which were widely criticized as involving political favoritism.210
The lesson from all of this is that the more distant the firm is from the credit
markets the more skeptical we should be of a decision to bail it out.211
A striking fact about the 2007–2008 rescues is that nearly all of them
were ex post efficient.  Most of the rescues followed the Bagehot dictum:
most of the financial institutions suffered liquidity shortages but were other-
wise solvent.  The loans to them were repaid in full.212  The government con-
tinues to earn returns on its Fannie and Freddie bailout and is likely to come
out well ahead.
However, a profitable bailout is not the same as a socially optimal
bailout.  Every bailout raises numerous choices as to how it is structured: what
the rate of interest should be, the term, the collateral, and so on.  It is appro-
priate to criticize even a profitable bailout if it could have been structured so
as to provide a greater benefit to the public.
209 See, e.g., GRETCHEN MORGENSON & JOSHUA ROSNER, RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT 177,
302–04 (2011) (arguing that the bailouts favored connected individuals).
210 See supra note 186.
211 Indeed, in 1999 and 2000, the federal government enacted legislation creating loan
guarantee programs for domestic oil, gas, steel, and rural television.  While these programs
looked similar to the Lockheed and 1979 Chrysler bailouts, they were not bailouts.  It is
unlikely that the programs had anything to do with protecting viable firms, or stopping
macroeconomic shocks.  They were subsidies to help politically favored industries.
212 Kiel & Nguyen, supra note 66.
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2. Fairness/Discrimination
A second source of controversy for bailouts is that they often seem arbi-
trary and unfair.  In every case study that we examined, a critic of the bailout
asked why one firm—Lockheed or Chrysler, for example—received a bailout
while thousands of other firms in financial distress did not.  During the finan-
cial crisis in 2008, critics asked why Bear and AIG were saved but not Leh-
man, and why Wall Street firms were saved while most ordinary people were
allowed to default on their mortgages.
Questions of fairness also arise about how bailouts are structured.  Many
creditors of General Motors and Chrysler believed that the government
showed preference for union members.  In a recent lawsuit, shareholders of
AIG, whose equity was diluted by the government rescue, complained that
AIG was treated more harshly than the other rescued firms, which were not
required to disgorge equity to the government.  Even critics of AIG wonder
whether it was fair of the government to use AIG’s assets to pay off its
counterparties in full—leading some commentators to accuse the govern-
ment of engaging in a “backdoor” (that is, hidden) bailout of the counterpar-
ties, which included Goldman Sachs, among others.213  Indeed, critics have
charged that the government showed favoritism to Goldman, Citigroup, and
other Wall Street firms with which government officials had close ties.214
3. Moral Hazard
The major worry about bailouts is that they can produce socially undesir-
able incentives.  If bailouts occur with regularity, then private agents will pre-
dict that they will occur whenever the conditions associated with bailouts
occur.  If agents can predict who will receive bailouts, and under what condi-
tions, with reasonable accuracy, then they will change their behavior in vari-
ous ways.
The prospect of bailouts can lead to different types of bad behavior.  If
the market anticipates that, consistently with Bagehot, solvent but illiquid
firms will receive bailouts, then creditors will not take into account the liquid-
ity risk of borrowers—that is, including both the liquidity of borrowers’ assets
and the care with which management handles liquidity issues.  If the market
anticipates that the government will bail out insolvent firms, then creditors
will also not concern themselves with credit risk.  A derivative worry is that
borrowers will maneuver themselves into the position in which they are likely
to be rescued because this reduces their cost of credit.  The “too-big-to-fail”
problem is one manifestation of this concern.  If everyone knows that the
government will bail out only large firms, then creditors will reduce credit
213 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
SIGTARP-10-003, FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES
30 (2009), http://www.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/Factors_Affecting_Efforts_to_
Limit_Payments_to_AIG_Counterparties.pdf.
214 DARON ACEMOGLU ET AL., THE VALUE OF CONNECTIONS IN TURBULENT TIMES: EVI-
DENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES 38 (2014), http://economics.mit.edu/files/9847.
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costs only for large firms.  To obtain the benefit of lower credit costs, firms
will grow beyond an efficient scale.  Finally, if government lending is too gen-
erous, borrowers will be reluctant to switch to private lenders as the credit
markets improve.
Worries about moral hazard played a significant role in the govern-
ment’s response to the financial crisis, but the government acted inconsis-
tently.  The government allowed Lehman to fail and imposed harsh terms on
AIG at least in part—according to some—to counter moral hazard.215  But
the government also gave generous terms—low interest rates—to numerous
other financial institutions.216  While some authors make a virtue of the gov-
ernment’s inconsistency by arguing that uncertainty about whether one will
receive a bailout reduces moral hazard,217 the proper method for inducing
uncertainty is to randomize rather than favor the politically connected, who
know who they are.  Moreover, inconsistency will harm the primary goal of
the government, which is to restore confidence in the financial system.  That
was the lesson of the failure of Lehman, which was unexpected because the
government had earlier saved Bear Stearns, and precipitated the massive
flight to liquidity that almost destroyed the financial system.
Bagehot counsels a relatively high rate of interest to deter moral hazard,
but central banks have generally disregarded this advice because they worry
that if they charge high rates, borrowers will refuse to borrow, or will wait too
long before borrowing.218  This worry might seem paradoxical since it
implies that borrowers would voluntarily turn down loans in the middle of a
liquidity crisis, when credit is tight.  But there is a reason for this.  Banks and
other financial institutions worry that if they accept an emergency loan, the
market will infer that they are insolvent or on the brink of insolvency.219  So
while the government may lend to them in the short-term, they will lose
access to private credit in the medium- and long-term.  During the
2007–2008 financial crisis, banks dealt with the problem of stigma by refusing
loans from the discount window and instead borrowing in more hidden
ways—by seeking more depositors protected by the FDIC, borrowing from
Federal Home Loan Banks, and relying on the Fed’s broad-based facilities.220
215 See Abigail Field, Lehman Report: Why the U.S. Balked at Bailing Out Lehman, DAILY FIN.
(Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/03/15/why-the-u-s-balked-at-bailout-
out-lehman/; Andrew Ross Sorkin, What Timothy Geithner Really Thinks, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(May 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/magazine/what-timothy-geithner-
really-thinks.html; Andrew Zajac & Christie Smythe, AIG’s Risks Seen by Geithner as Requiring
Tough Terms, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-
08/geithner-blames-aig-management-for-2008-financial-woes.html.
216 Dean Baker, TARP Give Aways, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 18, 2010), http://prospect.org/
article/tarp-give-aways.
217 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 17, at 123–24.
218 Jenny Corbett & Janet Mitchell, Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Effect of Reputa-
tion, 32 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 474, 476–77 (2000).
219 Id. at 477 (exploring the reputation incentive for firms to reject beneficial bailout
offers).
220 See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Three Discount Windows, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 795 (2014).
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But all this suggests that the moral hazard problem is partly self-correcting
and largely exaggerated.  If firms are penalized with stigma, they will not use
emergency loans except as a last resort, and most likely only when there is a
full-blown financial crisis.221  And the probability of a full-blown financial cri-
sis itself appears exceedingly small.  There have been only two in the United
States over the last 80 years.  The latest financial crisis was anticipated by no
one.  If the probability that emergency loans will be needed is exceedingly
small, then the availability of such loans can only trivially affect the ex ante
incentives of banks.
4. Process
Bailouts almost always take place in emergency conditions, with the
result that they occur in a rush, with little public debate and deliberation,
and often no transparency.  This is understandable but it also raises con-
cerns.  Critics of bailouts worry that the government will abuse its powers in
all the ways described above—by rescuing firms that should fail, by discrimi-
nating against the politically weak, and by creating moral hazard problems
for the future.222  Transparency may be the only way to mollify them and to
maintain public support for the bailout process.
During the financial crisis, it was often difficult to understand why the
government made certain decisions—why it rescued Bear but let Lehman
fail, for example.  The official reasons were often legalistic and not credible.
For example, officials explained that the Fed could not rescue Lehman
because it lacked legal authority to lend to an insolvent firm,223 yet the Fed
did lend (indirectly) to Bear Stearns.224  In the AIG lawsuit, the plaintiffs
argued that if the government really sought to punish AIG for its reckless
conduct (as government officials have sometimes said), then the government
should have brought legal proceedings against AIG, which would have
occurred with due process and independently of any Fed loan.225  Critics
complained that Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s initial draft for EESA
gave Treasury almost unlimited authority, and that the later, more precisely
written draft was misleading (it suggested that Treasury would buy toxic
221 Of course the availability of hidden borrowing reduces the power of stigma to cor-
rect for moral hazard.  This supports our suggestion below at Section IV.B for favoring
transparency whenever other factors allow.
222 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 8, at 63 (noting the moral hazard and uncertainty intro-
duced by bailouts); John B. Taylor, Opinion, How to Avoid a ‘Bailout Bill’, WALL ST. J. (May
3, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487038719045752166330612
19378 (noting the danger that bailout discretion will create moral hazard and other
problems).
223 James B. Stewart & Peter Eavis, Revisiting the Lehman Brothers Bailout That Never Was,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/business/revisiting-
the-lehman-brothers-bailout-that-never-was.html.
224 Id.
225 See Second Amended Verified Class Action Complaint at 10–11, Starr Int’l Co. v.
United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 628 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 11, 2013) (No. 1:11CV00779).
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assets, when in fact Treasury used most of the funds to buy preferred stock in
banks).  Courts played virtually no role in constraining the government dur-
ing the crisis, and have been only modestly more important in adjudicating
post-crisis disputes.226
Similar complaints were leveled at the 2009 auto bailouts.227  The courts
were involved through the bankruptcy process.  But the outcome was deter-
mined through private negotiations.  At best the judicial process ensured that
the bailout plan designed by the White House met with technical require-
ments of the Bankruptcy Code.228  But the bankruptcy court had no power to
review whether or not the government financing of the GM and Chrysler
firms prior to, throughout, and after bankruptcy filings was an appropriate
use of TARP funds.  Treasury was nothing more than a large secured creditor
that was financing the bankruptcy proceedings—how that came to be is not a
question with which bankruptcy law is concerned.  Additionally, the bank-
ruptcy court permitted the sales under a process that foreordained the
payouts to certain stakeholders, foreclosing a market test of the government’s
claims that no alternative was available.229
But at the other end of the spectrum is the Lockheed bailout.  There,
Congress had an open debate and the bill almost failed.  This highlights the
most vexing concern with bailouts.  The general preference is for bailouts
that are efficient in a broad sense.  But people have temporally inconsistent
preferences.  Ex ante, the public may view an optimal bailout as one that is
good policy taking into account moral hazard, fairness, and ex post effi-
ciency.  During the crisis, the public view will be skewed by the salience of the
immediate losses, by questions about whether those losses will be borne by
certain constituencies, and by a general lack of information about the true
risk.  Ex post, their views will be skewed by hindsight and other biases.  These
problems are prevalent in all crises.  Information and biases change continu-
ously.230  The shifting public and political response to the threat of Ebola in
the fall of 2014 provides a recent example.231
In sum, process matters.  The government needs discretion when it
structures bailouts, but it also can abuse that discretion.  Procedural con-
straints are a tried-and-true approach for limiting such abuse.
226 See Zaring, supra note 10, at 1406.
227 See Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 174, at 1406–07; Roe & Skeel, supra note 15, at
766–67.
228 Perhaps it did not even provide that. See Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler
LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) (citing United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 41
(1950)) (vacating and remanding lower court ruling to dismiss the appeal as moot).
229 See Adler, supra note 188, at 307; Roe & Skeel, supra note 15, at 733–34.
230 See, e.g., Daniel Bennett et al., Learning During a Crisis: The SARS Epidemic in Taiwan,
112 J. DEV. ECON. 1, 2 (2015).
231 See, e.g., Helene Cooper, In Homeland, Liberia Native Finds Resilience Amid Horror, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/world/africa/in-homeland-
liberia-native-finds-resilience-amid-horror-.html.
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IV. PRINCIPLES FOR GOVERNING BAILOUTS
Our diagnosis of the problems with bailouts suggests some principles for
reform.  We are mindful of the paradox of regulating bailouts.  Because
bailouts occur ex post, Congress can always change the rules of any statute
that attempts to regulate them.  But this paradox should not be exaggerated.
First, in practice, Congress has delegated bailout power to regulators like the
Fed and FDIC, and may be reluctant to revise the statutes that govern those
agencies in the midst of a crisis.  Second, even in a crisis a statute can be
sticky.  Congress may not want to repeal it, and if it does not, a court may
interpret Congress’s actions in light of that statute.  Finally, even if statutory
constraints are infeasible, it may be useful to state principles that enable the
public and press to evaluate an ongoing bailout.  The principles thus serve a
political function.232
A. Substantive Principles
1. Ex Post Efficiency
Financial bailouts.  Virtually all bailouts of illiquid but solvent financial
firms are ex post efficient.  The reason is that the Fed can create as much
liquidity as it wants, and it is certain to be repaid if the firm is solvent.  Thus,
a bailout has zero cost—indeed, may be profitable—for the taxpayer.233  On
the benefit side, a loan to an illiquid firm enables it to avoid failing.  While
the sale of goods at fire-sale prices is not itself an efficiency loss because the
buyer gains what the seller loses, the collapse of a firm can produce conta-
gion that ultimately sucks credit from the economy, causing macroeconomic
harms.  Even if it does not, the loss of organizational capital is likely to be
severe.234  For these reasons, bailouts of illiquid but solvent firms are socially
desirable, all else equal.
The case for bailing out insolvent firms is more difficult.  The benefits
are the same—the bailout reduces the risk of contagion and preserves organ-
ization capital.  But now there are costs.  A loan to an insolvent firm is really
just a transfer of resources to the firm, and the taxpayer must pay this cost.
(If the Fed makes the loan, then the cost will show up indirectly as inflation
or a taxpayer bailout of the Fed, at least at the margin.)  A further considera-
tion is that sometimes it is not clear whether a firm is insolvent or merely
illiquid, especially during a financial crisis; so there is a chance that a loan
will be repaid.  Moreover, a bailout of an insolvent firm is often just an indi-
rect way of bailing out its creditors—which may be illiquid but solvent.  To
232 Conceivably, constitutional rules could be enacted through amendment, or courts
could use the principles to evaluate constitutional challenges to specific bailouts.  The for-
mer seems infeasible, however.  As for the latter, this is essentially the argument of the
plaintiff in Starr v. U.S. See supra note 225.
233 The moral hazard costs—relating to liquidity management—are likely to be small.
234 See generally Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propaga-
tion of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257 (1983).
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sum up, the case for bailing out an insolvent firm is weaker than the case for
bailing out an illiquid but solvent firm.  There should be a rebuttable pre-
sumption against such bailouts.
Non-financial bailouts.  The case for bailing out non-financial firms is
weaker still.  The reason is that the collapse of a non-financial firm will rarely
have contagion effects.  Non-financial institutions typically rely much less on
debt than financial firms do; so losses are spread through thousands of
equity-holders rather than concentrated on a smaller number of debtors.
The major argument for rescuing non-financial firms arises when there is a
systemic liquidity crisis—as occurred during 2007–2008—wherein these firms
cannot borrow even a modest amount of money, even when they are solvent.
The bailout would be justified for purely macroeconomic reasons—the fail-
ure of thousands of firms would cause a recession.  Thus, non-financial firms
should be bailed out only under unusual circumstances—when they are sol-
vent but cannot borrow as a result of systemic collapse in the credit market.
2. Moral Hazard
The major problem caused by bailouts is that they may generate per-
verse incentives in the future.  This raises the question whether a bailout
should be structured so as to minimize those effects.  As we saw, if bailouts
are given out too freely, then creditors may disregard the credit and liquidity
risk of borrowers, and borrowers may thus be able to engage in excessive risk.
There are two ways to minimize this perversity.  First, and most impor-
tant, bailouts should be given out only during a systemic financial crisis—that
is, a crisis where all or nearly all lending stops, in all areas of finance, proba-
bly at the global level.  Financial crises of this type are probably rare enough
that their effect on incentives will be small.  The one exception is for firms
that are too big to fail.  If a firm’s own collapse poses systemic financial risk,
the moral hazard problem is more severe.  Other remedies, such as those we
discuss next, are necessary in those cases.
Second, an argument can be made that bailouts should be accompanied
by haircuts,235 high interest rates (as advocated by Bagehot), and other pen-
alties or payments for ensuring that creditors and shareholders suffer some
harm.  The prospect of such losses would further deter people from taking
on excessive risk.  However, imposing such costs may do more harm than
good.  If people believe that they will not be fully compensated, then they
may hoard cash.  Nevertheless, it seems appropriate for our principles to
allow for haircuts and related measures, particularly when firms are viewed as
too big to fail.
These points suggest that bailouts of firms during normal economic
times are almost always a bad idea.  The government should carry a heavy
burden of proof if it believes that a bailout is necessary to halt an incipient
crisis.  This is particularly true for non-financial firms, which typically are not
systemically interconnected with the financial system, and small, non-inter-
235 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 17, at 124.
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connected financial firms.  Thus, we advocate a strong presumption against
bailouts except during a liquidity crisis that affects the entire financial system.
The presumption should be rebuttable where the government can make the
case that the failure of a firm would have significant macroeconomic conse-
quences, but we cannot think of any event in U.S. history that would qualify.
By contrast, bailouts should be presumptively available during a liquidity
crisis for solvent firms, as Bagehot recommends.  If the firms are solvent,
then they cannot be faulted for taking on too much credit risk.  It may be the
case that firms have mismanaged liquidity.  However, a true system-wide
liquidity crisis will destroy firms that have managed liquidity wisely as well as
those that have managed liquidity poorly.  The government should not pun-
ish firms that have mismanaged liquidity by denying them bailouts or impos-
ing haircuts because (1) it will be very difficult, during the crisis, to evaluate
the quality of a firm’s liquidity management, and so the government would
risk punishing the wrong firms; (2) punishment is inconsistent with the
major goal of restoring confidence to creditors; and (3) there is no way
(short of winding down a firm) to hedge against a true liquidity crisis, so it is
doubtful that bailing out firms during a full-blown liquidity crisis will affect
their incentives to manage liquidity during normal times.
This leaves the category of financial firms that are insolvent during a
liquidity crisis.  Bagehot argued that the central bank should not lend to such
firms, but most economists believe that such firms should not be allowed to
collapse in a disorderly fashion.  The FDIC takes over insolvent banks and
pays off depositors (in effect, bailing them out) while winding down the insti-
tution.  The Fed appears to have been seriously hampered during the
2007–2008 crisis by the rule that it cannot lend to insolvent non-banks like
Lehman.
The major worry is that if insolvent institutions are rescued, creditors will
make bad loans, knowing that the government is likely to pay them back.
These loans will produce significant costs to the real economy—in the form
of, for example, the construction of shopping malls that no one uses.  On the
other hand, if insolvent institutions are systemically connected, their collapse
exacerbates a liquidity crisis.  Accordingly, we suggest that there should be no
presumption against lending to (or investing in) insolvent firms during a full-
blown liquidity crisis.  However, the government (or central bank) should be
permitted to structure the loans so as to penalize shareholders.
3. Fairness
One of the most difficult problems created by bailouts is that, unavoid-
ably, some people are benefited while others are not.  During the 2007–2008
financial crisis, bailouts benefited the creditors and shareholders of Bear
more than those of Lehman; the shareholders of Goldman and Morgan Stan-
ley more than the shareholders of AIG; and Wall Street firms more than
homeowners.  It is very likely that numerous distributional outcomes are con-
sistent with ex post and ex ante efficiency.  For example, it may be the case
that the government could quiet a crisis by bailing out firms A, B, and C; or
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B, C, and D, but need not bail out all four: if so, how should it decide?  The
government could also impose haircuts of various sizes on different creditors
of the same firm.
The danger of unfairness is particularly acute during a financial crisis.
In a financial crisis, the government, as lender of last resort, effectively has a
monopoly over credit.  Thus, it can charge a much higher price than is justi-
fied by moral hazard concerns, and can discriminate in order to advance
political aims.  By contrast, during normal times, the government has no such
monopoly.  If a firm cannot obtain loans, that usually means it is insolvent,
and there is no particular worry if the government “overcharges” the firm,
since the shareholders are not entitled to any payoff.
In light of this argument, we suggest a few principles.
During financial crises, the government should set a price that reflects the relevant
economic parameters rather than the price that maximizes the return to the government
or taxpayers.  This is simply a restatement of Bagehot’s advice that government
should charge a price somewhat higher than what would prevail in a normal
market.  The key implication, however, is that the government may not
charge an even higher price, even if firms are willing to pay it.  Other ele-
ments of Bagehot’s approach—such as the requirement that loans be fully
secured—should also be followed.  Surprisingly, they are not already clearly
embodied in the law.236
Avoid favoring politically connected firms.  Many critics accused the govern-
ment of favoring politically connected banks—above all, Goldman Sachs and
Citigroup.  Henry Paulson, the Treasury Secretary during the Bush adminis-
tration, was a former Goldman CEO and hired numerous Goldman execu-
tives to work in Treasury.237  Timothy Geithner, the New York Federal
Reserve Bank president and then Treasury Secretary, admitted in his
memoirs that he underestimated Citigroup’s problems because his mentor,
Robert Rubin, sat on its board.238  The public perception that the govern-
ment favored Wall Street complicated the government’s response.  The pub-
lic, for example, wanted the government to cut the salaries of Wall Street
executives, while the government believed that in some cases it lacked the
legal authority to do so, and in other cases that such a move would deter
banks from seeking help or cause the resignations of executives who were in
the best position to help banks return to health.  But while one can ask the
government to be sensitive about this problem, it is unrealistic to propose
that it refuse to bail out politically connected firms.  All major firms are polit-
ically connected.
236 See Tucker, supra note 36.
237 Julie Creswell & Ben White, The Guys from ‘Government Sachs’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/business/19gold.html?pagewanted=all.
238 TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST 135 (2014).
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Favor ordinary people, such as homeowners.  Many critics of the govern-
ment’s handling of the financial crisis who believed that the government
favored Wall Street argued that the government should have done more for
homeowners.  Late in the crisis, the government responded by creating some
programs to help bail out homeowners, but these had little effect, as we dis-
cussed above.  We agree that, all else equal, it makes more sense for the gov-
ernment to bail out ordinary people than large firms.  A key distinction is
that ordinary people are risk-averse, while large firms are owned by diversi-
fied shareholders.  Unfortunately, bailouts of ordinary people such as home-
owners may be administratively infeasible.  As the number of bailout
recipients increases, the government must spend more money on administra-
tive costs.  These bailouts also raise other fairness questions—for example,
why favor people who bought homes on credit over other kinds of debtors,
like credit card debtors?
Avoid disfavoring foreigners.  A politically sensitive issue during the crisis
was the treatment of foreign financial institutions.239  The Fed ended up bail-
ing out foreign banks as well as domestic banks because the credit market is
global, not national.  If foreigners believe they will not be rescued, and so
refuse to lend to American institutions, then the credit crisis will not be
solved.  But the public had no sympathy for foreigners, and the Fed tried to
conceal its efforts on their behalf.240  Here, we think the Fed was correct.  As
a presumption, financial bailouts should not discriminate against foreigners.
Is distributive neutrality possible?  A kind of formal distributive neutrality is
achievable if the government can commit itself to general eligibility stan-
dards that classes of firms satisfy.241  If it were to do so, it would simply
announce that any firm that satisfied the principle described above would be
entitled to a bailout.  This may not be practical, however.  One problem is
that the government may be overwhelmed by applications for bailouts, espe-
cially during a financial crisis; another is that the principles are malleable
enough to permit favoritism at the margin.
Dodd-Frank permits only bailouts of groups of firms that satisfy broad-
based eligibility requirements.242  This would limit favoritism toward individ-
ual firms.  The crisis provides some examples of what broad-based require-
ments could mean.  The Fed set up a number of facilities that extended
credit to certain classes of debtors—banks that sought to borrow against
239 See, e.g., NEIL IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS: THREE CENTRAL BANKERS AND A WORLD ON
FIRE 151–55 (2013); Neil Irwin, How Ben Bernanke Saved Europe’s Banks, GLOBALIST (May 12,
2013), http://www.theglobalist.com/how-ben-bernanke-saved-europes-banks/; Jia Lynn
Yang et al., Fed Aid in Financial Crisis Went Beyond U.S. Banks to Industry, Foreign Firms, WASH.
POST (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/
01/AR2010120106870.html.
240 IRWIN, supra note 239, at 154.
241 Including auction facilities.
242 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1101, 124 Stat. 1376, 2113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl201.txt unknown Seq: 55  1-FEB-16 7:57
2015] a  framework  for  bailout  regulation 533
asset-backed securities, primary dealers, firms that rely on the commercial
paper market, and so on.  Broad-based requirements do not eliminate the
risk of discrimination because the government can design the requirements
to favor certain firms.  But they do probably make favoritism toward individ-
ual firms a bit more difficult than it might otherwise be.
Whether such a principle would be justified is hard to say.  The benefit,
as noted, is that it would reduce discrimination, but the reduction might be
minimal.  The cost of such a principle is that it may sometimes be the case
that rescues of individual firms are justified.  The government believed (cor-
rectly or not) that if Long Term Capital Management failed, it would take
numerous big banks with it.243  During the 2007–2008 crisis, individualized
loans were made to rescue Bear and AIG, and an individualized loan should
probably have been made to save Lehman.  The configuration of credit net-
works is unpredictable; broad-based eligibility requirements may thus inter-
fere with needed rescues in future crises.
4. Administrative Costs
A last consideration is that if the government offers bailouts too freely, it
will be overwhelmed by applications for money.  Bagehot said that the central
bank should lend to “this man and that,” and section 13(3) allows the Fed to
lend to anyone.  But Bagehot also argued that the rate should be set high
enough to deter people from applying for cheap loans who really did not
need them.
These are arguments for credit rationing, and they raise anew the worry
that the central bank can use arguments about administrative costs to dis-
guise favoritism toward politically connected firms.
Worries about administrative costs might explain why Dodd-Frank
requires the Fed to use broad-based programs with uniform eligibility
requirements.  On this approach, Fed officials do not need to weigh the ben-
efits and costs of loans on a borrower-by-borrower basis, and instead can dele-
gate to subordinates the mechanical process of determining whether
applicants satisfy the eligibility requirements.  As we noted above, we are
skeptical that broad-based eligibility requirements can really constrain the
Fed.  While the Fed may be able to use administrative costs as an explanation
for discriminating against some firms, such explanations must be evaluated
carefully.
B. Procedural Principles
What procedural principles should govern bailouts?
Should Congress bail out firms or should regulatory agencies do so?  Generally
speaking, a regulator should engage in bailouts for the same reason that reg-
ulators typically engage in executive action—they can act more quickly and
243 See THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 66, at 18–22.
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flexibly than Congress can, and are less likely to be influenced by irrelevant
political factors.  The financial crisis provides the best illustration of this
claim.  The Fed and FDIC were able to bail out firms with great rapidity and
flexibility.  By contrast, when Congress was forced to act, it acted slowly and
erratically; produced a statute that paid off various interest groups in order to
obtain the consent of recalcitrant members of Congress and in the end gave
almost unlimited discretion to Treasury.  Congressional involvement may
have been necessary for political legitimacy, but if it had been avoidable, it
should have been avoided.244
Economists and central bankers seem largely in consensus that central
banks should not make emergency loans to insolvent firms.245  They believe
that central banks occupy a precarious position in a democracy because they
must be given independence so that they can resist short-term political pres-
sures—for example, to use inflation to stimulate the economy before an elec-
tion.  To avoid a political backlash, central banks must confine themselves to
the least controversial actions that are consistent with their mission.  Loans
that are paid back will create less political outrage than loans that are not
paid back and are instead absorbed by the taxpayer.
All of this might be true, but it seems to us questionable.  The political
backlash against the Fed during the last crisis took place even though the Fed
did lend only to solvent firms.  The Fed’s failure to lend to Lehman—which
was thought at the time to be insolvent—was its greatest error.  Congress
punished the Fed, anyway.  We suspect that the Fed will maintain legitimacy
and independence just to the extent that it fulfills its mission.  If it stops a
financial crisis with speed and efficiency, it will retain its independence.  This
suggests that it should be given a broad array of tools, including the power to
make loans to insolvent firms if it believes that the loans will help end a crisis.
Should regulators hold hearings before bailouts?  Many people complained
that regulators acted without transparency during the financial crisis.  Trans-
parency would have required some kind of public process like a hearing in
which interested parties could submit arguments for or against a proposed
bailout.  All things equal, hearings make sense because they inform the pub-
lic and may provide evidence and arguments against bailouts that are unwise.
The recipients of potential bailouts should be given an opportunity to pro-
pose terms, as should affected parties (such as creditors of the recipient).
However, sometimes there will not be enough time for hearings, and often it
may be the case that a proposed bailout must be kept secret until the last
minute.  Secrecy may be necessary to facilitate private rescues or to enable
the government to put off a decision until one is necessary.  Still, on balance
there should be a presumption in favor of a hearing.
244 A huge literature exists on the closely related question of whether the central bank
should be independent or not.  For a valuable, recent discussion in the context of emer-
gency liquidity authority, see Tucker, supra note 36.
245 For a powerful statement, see Tucker, supra note 36, at 40–41.
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Should courts play a role in bailout regulation?  Judicial involvement is una-
voidable because bailouts must obey constitutional norms and relevant state
and federal law constraints on lending transactions and corporate invest-
ments.  But the amount of judicial involvement is a policy choice.  At one
extreme, we could imagine that parties affected by a bailout could seek judi-
cial review before the bailout is consummated.  The court would approve the
bailout only if it complies with our substantive principles, giving the appro-
priate deference to the factual determinations of the regulator.  At another
extreme, judicial review could be limited.  Our view is that because of the
inherent limitations of judicial review, courts should not be permitted to
block otherwise lawful bailouts that violate the principles that we propose.246
However, courts could play a more significant role after the bailout and
the return of normal markets.  In principle, courts could determine ex post if
the bailout complied with the principles that we have proposed.  If a bailout
imposed excessively harsh terms on a party, or was improperly denied, the
affected parties might appropriately be entitled to a remedy.
The role of courts in reviewing bailouts is currently being litigated.
Because no statutory bailout framework exists, the claims are based on the
Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.247  The vagueness of this clause ren-
ders it less than ideal for evaluating these claims.  If courts decide that a
judicial role in evaluating bailouts is appropriate under the Constitution,
then the case for a statutory framework would be strengthened.
For example, a statute could create a specific cause of action for chal-
lenging a bailout.  To allow for the discretion necessary for implementing
bailouts, the challenge would have to be after the fact and provide for dam-
ages rather than injunctive relief.  The particular elements of the claim could
be grounded in the substantive principles laid out above.  The benefit of
doing so would be to direct the judicial oversight to the specific areas where
government actors are most likely to abuse their discretion.  This would be
more precise and targeted than litigation based on vague takings claims.  To
cover the full scope of potential violations, standing would have to be
expanded to include those who could pursue more general claims that the
substantive principles have been violated.248
On the other hand, even ex post litigation can chill the exercise of dis-
cretion in an emergency.  The more onerous the penalties imposed after the
fact, the more hesitant a government actor will be to implement a bailout
program.  Personal liability for government actors, for example, would be too
extreme.  The benefit of creating damages claims against the government is
that they impose a political cost along with providing transparency through
judicial review.  The key is to calibrate those political costs to discourage gov-
246 See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 52–54 (2010).
247 See Zaring, supra note 10, at 1433 (“In some ways, the takings cases exemplify the
advantages of ex post review . . . .”).
248 Cf. id. at 1481 (discussing the limitations that standing requirements placed on the
scope of financial crisis litigation).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-2\ndl201.txt unknown Seq: 58  1-FEB-16 7:57
536 notre dame law review [vol. 91:2
ernment actors from the more capricious use of their bailout authority while
not deterring them from using that authority when justified.
CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX OF BAILOUT REGULATION
Dodd-Frank’s sponsors and supporters argued that the statute would
make future bailouts unnecessary, and yet at the same time the statute con-
tinues to authorize the Fed to issue bailouts (albeit subject to greater restric-
tions than in the past) and gives the FDIC greater authority to make bailouts
than under prior law.  This schizophrenia has long been characteristic of
bailout regulation, which does indeed have a paradoxical element to it.
The paradox is that the government wants both to commit not to make
bailouts and to be able to make bailouts if they are necessary.  The reason for
committing not to make bailouts is that if bailouts are not available, then
people will be more prudent with their finances, and thus financial crises
may never occur.  But the reason for making bailouts available is that even if
people are prudent with their finances—or, if they are not but are able to
exploit loopholes in order to circumvent regulation—then bailouts are nec-
essary to prevent macroeconomic collapse.
Over the years, governments have attempted to solve the paradox by
establishing ex ante insurance programs, under which potential bailout ben-
eficiaries pay in advance for their bailouts and submit to regulation that
requires them to behave prudently.  Unfortunately, insurance systems are
only as good as predictions about the future, and the crystal ball is always
hazy.  The paradox of bailout regulation is that because the conditions under
which bailouts are issued are unpredictable, it is impossible to set up an ex
ante insurance system to govern all such conditions.  This means that bailouts
will always be necessary, and to some extent discretionary.
This creates another problem.  If the government enjoys discretion as to
which firms to bail out, and how to do so, it can abuse this discretion—to
reward political favorites (by offering them bailouts) and to punish others
(by refraining from giving them bailouts).  Thus, despite the heterogeneous-
ness and unpredictability of the conditions that justify bailouts, there is value
in confining the government’s discretion, even if only at the margins, by sup-
plying legal or political principles for evaluating the work of bailout
authorities.
If our arguments are accepted, then some legal reforms would be neces-
sary.  Dodd-Frank’s constraints on bailouts should be eliminated, so that the
Fed can make individualized rescues as well as bailouts based on broad-based
eligibility rules.  Congress should also either pass laws or issue non-binding
statements that encourage regulators to bail out companies only when the
negative macroeconomic effects of failure are significant and the moral haz-
ard effects are limited.  Procedural constraints should also be put into effect.
Perhaps, inspectors general and other watchdogs can be put on the alert for
political favoritism in bailout policy.  Regulators should be required to pro-
vide guidance documents that explain how they plan to administer and struc-
ture bailouts should the need arise.
